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BEYOND BAKKE: GRUTTER–GRATZ AND THE PROMISE OF 
BROWN 
JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 The Supreme Court’s long-awaited decisions this past summer in the 
Michigan affirmative action cases provided yet another landmark in the 
continuing controversy regarding race and education.  A quarter century, 
almost to the day, after the Court handed down its badly splintered decision in 
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,1 the Court again concluded 
that universities may sometimes, but not always, give some preference to racial 
and ethnic minorities in deciding whom to admit.  The Court, in a 5-4 decision 
in Grutter v. Bollinger, upheld the constitutionality of the University of 
Michigan Law School’s admission policy that considered race as one factor 
among many in achieving a diverse student body.2  It concluded that student 
body diversity was a compelling interest that justified using a racial 
classification and that the Law School’s admissions program, which avoided 
any formulaic approach, was narrowly tailored to that end.3  In the companion 
case, Gratz v. Bollinger, the Court held that the University of Michigan’s 
undergraduate admission program, which awarded minority applicants twenty 
percent of the total points needed for admission, violated the Equal Protection 
Clause.4  The Court found that, even if diversity was a compelling interest, a 
conclusion Grutter imposed, a twenty percent bump based on race was not 
 
* Associate Dean of Faculty and Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law.  Thanks to 
Saint Louis University School of Law and Dean Jeffrey Lewis for support for this Article and the 
conference in which a version was presented.  Thanks also to participants at a faculty workshop at 
Saint Louis University School of Law for their helpful comments.  Conversations with a number 
of friends and colleagues helped shape my thinking.  These included Eric Claeys, Roger 
Goldman, Alan Howard, Dan Hulsebosch, William Nelson, and Dennis Tuchler, some of whom 
commented on an earlier draft.  Kate Douglas provided superb research assistance and Mary 
Dougherty patiently retyped the manuscript.  I alone am responsible for any and all shortcomings. 
 1. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 2. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2347 (2003). 
 3. Id. at 2339. 
 4. Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2417 (2003). 
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narrowly tailored.5  The nine justices produced thirteen opinions; only Justice 
O’Connor joined both majority opinions.6 
As something of a split decision, Grutter-Gratz mirrored, in many respects, 
the outcome of Bakke a generation earlier.  There, the nine justices produced 
six opinions resulting in a decision striking down the admissions program at 
University of California Davis Medical School, to the extent that it set aside 
sixteen percent of the places for minority applicants, but allowing Davis to use 
race or ethnicity to produce a diverse class.7  Five justices thought the quota 
invalid, whereas five justices thought race could be considered.8  Only Justice 
Powell participated in both majorities.  He wrote the decisive opinion for the 
Court, but it was an opinion that none of his colleagues joined.9 
Grutter-Gratz covered much the same terrain as Bakke had twenty-five 
years earlier.  Indeed, in Grutter, the University of Michigan School of Law 
invoked Bakke at the beginning of the summary of its argument in its brief: 
Twenty-five years ago, this Court resolved a bitter national controversy over 
the constitutionality of race-conscious admissions policies in its landmark 
decision in Bakke.  The essential holding of Bakke is that quotas and set-asides 
are illegal, but that some attention may be paid to race in the context of a 
competitive review of the ways that each applicant will contribute to the 
overall diversity of the student body.10 
The Law School argued that Bakke was a direct precedent in support of its plan 
and urged the Court to rule in its favor on stare decisis grounds.11 
Barbara Grutter preferred to claim ancestral ties to an earlier case dealing 
with race in America, Brown v. Board of Education.12  Her counsel began his 
argument by quoting from the opening argument of Robert J. Carter before the 
 
 5. Id. at 2427-28. 
 6. Six justices wrote opinions in Grutter: Justice O’Connor (majority opinion), Justice 
Ginsburg (concurring), Justice Scalia (concurring in part and dissenting in part), Justice Thomas 
(concurring in part and dissenting in part), Chief Justice Rehnquist (dissenting), and Justice 
Kennedy (dissenting).  Seven justices wrote opinions in Gratz: Chief Justice Rehnquist (majority 
opinion), Justice O’Connor (concurring), Justice Thomas (concurring), Justice Breyer 
(concurring), Justice Souter (dissenting), Justice Ginsburg (dissenting), and Justice Stevens 
(dissenting). 
 7. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 271-72 (1978). 
 8. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Powell, Stevens, Stewart, and Burger thought the 
quota was invalid, and Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell felt that race 
should be considered. 
 9. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun joined sections I and V-C of Justice 
Powell’s opinion, the statement of facts and order reversing the state court decision that race and 
ethnicity could not be considered.  Justice White also joined section III-A, arguing that strict 
scrutiny was the appropriate standard. 
 10. Brief for Respondent at 12, Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) (No. 02-241). 
 11. Id. 
 12. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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Court on behalf of the plaintiffs in Brown in 1953.  “We have one fundamental 
contention which we will seek to develop in the course of this argument,” he 
said, “and that contention is that no state has any authority under the equal 
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to use race as a factor in 
affording educational opportunities among its citizens.”13  Fifty years later, 
Grutter “ask[ed] the Court to again vindicate the same principle,” that our 
Constitution is color-blind.14 
Were the decisions in Grutter-Gratz simply a rehash of Bakke?  And, does 
the Court’s rejection of Barbara Grutter’s argument represent abandonment of 
the principle animating Brown? 
To each question respectively, the answer is no and no.  Even a modest 
reading of Grutter-Gratz discloses them as a triumph for those advocating 
racial preference in admissions decisions.  They averted a disaster that other 
cases suggested might be in store.  At a minimum, Grutter placed affirmative 
action in admissions on much firmer footing than Bakke had left it.  Although 
many universities had relied on Justice Powell’s opinion in crafting their 
policies, some courts questioned its status as a binding precedent.15  Grutter 
endorsed Justice Powell’s  “view that student body diversity is a compelling 
state interest that can justify the use of race in university admissions.”16  
Whereas no rationale achieved a majority in Bakke, five justices embraced the 
diversity rationale in Grutter as articulated in Justice O’Connor’s opinion.17  
Accordingly, institutions of higher education were authorized to continue to 
use race as a factor in admissions decisions. 
Yet Grutter went well beyond Bakke in critical respects.  Justice O’Connor 
reviewed the law school’s plan more leniently than conventional applications 
of strict scrutiny would suggest.  Although Gratz limited the means available 
for use in admissions plans, Grutter provided some important flexibility.  Yet 
Justice O’Connor’s potentially most important contribution was the manner in 
which she greatly expanded the rationale supporting the use of race in 
admissions decisions.  Her defense was far broader than that Justice Powell 
had offered a quarter century earlier.  She did not confine her discussion to the 
narrow version of a student diversity rationale that Justice Powell had 
articulated.  Instead, she recognized the value of race-conscious admissions in 
bringing the United States closer to the dream of a nation of opportunity for all. 
 
 13. Brief for Petitioner at 18, Grutter, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (No. 02-241). 
 14. Id. 
 15. See, e.g., Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 
2001); Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256, 274-75 (5th Cir. 2000); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 
932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996).  But see Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188, 1200-01 
(9th Cir. 2000). 
 16. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2337. 
 17. Id. at 2339-41. 
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Far from repudiating Brown, as Barbara Grutter’s argument would imply, 
Grutter vindicated Brown. Brown’s central message was not the 
impermissibility of using race as a criterion for decisions, as Grutter suggested.  
Rather, it was that race could not be used to foreclose minorities, particularly 
blacks, from sharing in the American dream.  That chord resonates powerfully 
in Grutter as well. 
In many respects, it was Bakke, not Grutter, which deviated from Brown.  
Justice Powell’s Bakke opinion saved affirmative action in admissions but did 
so on a basis that emphasized values of the First, rather than Fourteenth, 
Amendment.  Justice Powell presented race simply as a means to foster 
diversity needs implicit in the First Amendment, not as a problem that America 
needed to address.  Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion in Grutter 
reintroduced the focus on race in significant respects.  She linked those plans 
in important ways to addressing America’s racial problems.  In doing so, she 
drew not only from Justice Powell’s Bakke opinion, but from the quite 
different opinion of Justice Marshall. 
This Article will begin by briefly outlining central principles of Brown.  
Section III will then present Bakke and show how it deviated from those tenets.  
Section IV will outline Grutter and Gratz and show how Grutter stretched 
doctrine regarding levels of scrutiny and the narrow tailoring of strict scrutiny.  
Finally, Section V will focus on Grutter’s main contribution, the expanded 
rationale for race preferences. 
II.  BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 
Brown v. Board of Education occupies an unusual position in the 
American legal canon.  On the one hand, Brown is “the single most honored 
opinion in the Supreme Court’s corpus,”18 a decision whose essential rightness 
is not a subject of controversy or even discussion.  No one today asserts that 
Brown was wrongly decided.19  Indeed, such a position is essentially 
unimaginable.  On the other hand, the opinion has been extensively critiqued.  
Some complain that Chief Justice Warren failed to articulate a sufficient basis 
for the ruling,20 that the rationale offered was “uninspired,”21 that the decision 
 
 18. Jack M. Balkin, Brown as Icon, in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD 
HAVE SAID 3, 4 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001). 
 19. But see WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra note 18, at 
185-200 (dissent of Derrick A. Bell). 
 20. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 31-35 (1959) (arguing that the problem with Brown is found in the reasoning of the 
opinion). 
 21. ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 216 (1960). 
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rested on shaky psychology rather than customary legal principles,22 that 
international imperatives or class motives drove the outcome,23 and that the 
decision was rich in symbolism but modest in its impact.24 
In Brown, the Court considered whether the doctrine of “separate but 
equal” was consistent with the promise of equal protection of the laws.  The 
doctrine made its way into constitutional law, of course, in 1896, in Plessy v. 
Ferguson, where the Court upheld Louisiana’s statutes providing for separate 
rail cars for blacks and whites traveling intrastate.25  Plessy had applied a 
reasonableness standard against which the Court thought a law authorizing or 
requiring racial segregation in public conveyances no “more obnoxious to the 
[F]ourteenth [A]mendment than the acts of [C]ongress requiring separate 
schools for colored children in the District of Columbia, the constitutionality of 
which does not seem to have been questioned, or the corresponding acts of 
state legislatures.”26  Indeed, laws establishing separate schools for white and 
black children were the “most common instance” of an exercise of state police 
power to prevent “commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to 
either.”27  The Court rejected as fallacious the argument “that the enforced 
separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of 
inferiority.”28  Justice Henry Billings Brown depicted separate-but-equal as a 
neutral doctrine that separated, but did not discriminate among, the races.  
Wrote Justice Brown: “If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the 
act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon 
it.”29  Justice Brown’s analysis could have been convincing only in a world 
hermetically sealed from American history.  Quite clearly, separation reflected 
a conviction that blacks were unequal to whites. 
The plaintiffs in Brown challenged the separate-but-equal doctrine in 
public schools—the specific application that Justice Brown had used as the 
prop for the doctrine he announced.  The Court concluded that “in the field of 
public education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place.”30  The vice 
of separate schools related entirely to their impact on African-American 
children.  Brown removed the issue from a logician’s paradise and returned it 
 
 22. See Earl M. Maltz, Brown v. Board of Education, in CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, 
CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES 207 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson eds.) (1998) 
(criticizing Brown as not supported by originalism). 
 23. See, e.g., MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2000). 
 24. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Brown v. Board of Education: Facts and Political 
Correctness, 80 VA. L. REV. 185 (1994). 
 25. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 26. Id. at 551. 
 27. Id. at 544. 
 28. Id. at 551. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
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to the real world.  Far from being neutral in its purpose or effect, segregation 
enforced by law made clear to African-Americans that they were second-class 
citizens, not full members of the American community.  “To separate them 
from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race 
generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may 
affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone,” Chief 
Justice Warren wrote in the opinion’s most powerful passage.31 
In retrospect, Brown stands for two distinct, but related, principles with 
continued relevance to modern constitutional discourse.  First, Brown 
represents the idea that educational opportunity should be open to all.  One of 
the few paragraphs in Chief Justice Warren’s brief opinion32 discusses the 
significance of education.  The punch line of the discussion is that when a state 
provides education, it “is a right which must be made available to all on equal 
terms.”33 
To be sure, what “equal terms” entails is a subject of great controversy, 
some of which is central to the debate regarding race-sensitive admissions.  
Moreover, in some respects, the Court has rejected this norm.  For instance, the 
Court has held that states may spend widely disproportionate sums to educate 
different children depending on whether they live in affluent or distressed areas 
without offending the Equal Protection Clause.34  The more instructive inquiry 
for present purposes is why the Court thought education was a good that 
needed to be distributed impartially. 
In Brown, the Court saw education as critical to achieving a “democratic 
society” in two respects.  First, education was instrumental in fostering civic 
performance.  “It is required in the performance of our most basic public 
responsibilities, even service in the armed forces.  It is the very foundation of 
good citizenship,” Chief Justice Warren wrote.35  Second, education was 
crucial to making real the American dream that the United States was a land of 
opportunity for all.  “In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably 
be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education,” 
he wrote.36  The reverse implication was that with an education any child could 
go as far as his ambition and talents would take him.  Chief Justice Warren saw 
 
 31. Id. at 494. 
 32. Brown covers just fourteen pages of the U.S. Reports.  The first three pages list the 
parties and attorneys, the next three and one-half pages state the facts and procedural history, the 
next three and one-half pages explain why the original intent of the Fourteenth Amendment is 
unclear and summarize past doctrine.  The last page announces plans for considering remedial 
issues.  Only approximately three pages state and justify the decision. 
 33. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493. 
 34. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
 35. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493. 
 36. Id. 
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the two as related, contributory streams to “our democratic society.”37  Indeed, 
the sentence that provided the link between the two ideals began by celebrating 
education as the key to civic responsibility (“Today it is a principal instrument 
in awakening the child to cultural values”) but, a comma later, invoked its role 
in fostering the American dream (“in preparing him for later professional 
training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment.”).38 
The second principle from Brown grows out of the Court’s explanation as 
to why separate-but-equal schools were “inherently unequal.”  The Court 
thought “intangible considerations,”39 which the Court had found relevant at 
the college and graduate level, applied “with added force”40 to black children: 
“To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely because 
of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the 
community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be 
undone.”41  Chief Justice Warren endorsed the lower court finding in Brown to 
the effect that legally mandated segregation adversely impacted the 
development of African-American children, in part by stamping them as 
inferior.42  Brown suggested that the Equal Protection Clause required America 
to take account of and remedy the perception blacks reasonably had of being 
excluded.  The Constitution required that America stop subjugating African-
Americans.  Brown embarked America on a journey to undo the vestiges of its 
history of racial oppression. The “feeling of inferiority” sentence expressed a 
deeper, communitarian notion of how majority groups should treat those 
lacking power.  It is noteworthy that the Court deemed tangible signs of 
equality as insufficient to constitute equal protection so long as segregation 
“generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community.”43  It was 
striking that the Court emphasized the messages society conveyed to African-
Americans as constitutional harms deserving remedy.  The law generally does 
not recognize “feelings” as subjects of its protection; when it does, it accords 
such intangibles secondary protection.  The Court’s focus on the “feeling of 
inferiority as to . . . status in the community” was accordingly significant in 
several respects. 
First, the rationale made clear that the Equal Protection Clause speaks not 
only to formal equality but also to more ephemeral notions of “status in the 
community.”  Implicitly, Brown teaches that society should be ordered in such 
 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id.  But see Elaine A. Alexander & Lawrence A. Alexander, The New Racism: An 
Analysis of the Use of Racial and Ethnic Criteria in Decision-Making, 9 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 190, 
235 (1972) (explaining that Brown was inapposite to de facto segregation). 
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a way that members of no group would reasonably feel like lesser members of 
the community.  As such, stigma becomes a constitutionally significant 
concept.  Second, the rationale suggests that the Equal Protection Clause does 
not operate symmetrically for whites and blacks.  Significantly, Chief Justice 
Warren did not adopt Mr. Carter’s argument regarding the relevancy of race.  
Brown avoids any proclamation that the Constitution is color-blind.  On the 
contrary, its focus is on redressing the impact of the feelings of inferiority from 
state-imposed segregation.  Chief Justice Warren’s pivotal “feeling of 
inferiority” sentence could only have been written about African-American 
children in 1954.  The sentence would have made no sense in America at that 
time in reference to white children. 
III.  THE JOURNEY TO GRUTTER AND GRATZ 
A. Bakke 
In many respects, Bakke was an earlier generation’s version of Grutter-
Gratz.  Bakke had held invalid the medical school admissions program at 
University of California at Davis that set aside sixteen spots for minority 
applicants.  The four justices44 who joined Justice Powell in striking down the 
Davis plan never reached the constitutional issue.  Instead, they concluded that 
the Davis plan violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  Four 
justices45 would have upheld the Davis plan that Justice Powell deemed an 
unconstitutional quota.  Although Justice Powell concluded that the Davis plan 
did serve a compelling need in producing a diverse student body, he found that 
the University had misconceived  “the nature of the state interest that would 
justify consideration of race or ethnic background.”46  The valued diversity 
“encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which 
racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important element.”47  The Davis 
plan was not narrowly tailored to meet that need.  The Court held, however, 
that admissions programs could consider race as a factor in determining which 
applicants to accept.48 
 
 44. The Justices who joined Justice Powell were Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Stewart, 
Rehnquist and Stevens. 
 45. The Justices who would have upheld the Davis plan were Justices Brennan, White, 
Marshall, and Blackmun. 
 46. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315 (1978). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Justice Powell apparently wanted to affirm the use of race in admissions while striking 
down the Davis plan’s set-aside.  Nevertheless, he initially intended to cast his decision merely as 
affirming the California Supreme Court’s decision.  Justice Brennan persuaded him at conference 
that the California Supreme Court had also held any use of race invalid and that accordingly, 
Justice Powell should cast his decision as reversing the state court in part.  Justice Powell quickly 
agreed with Justice Brennan’s analysis, thereby allowing Bakke to be depicted as a split decision 
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Justice Powell found two intrinsic characteristics in the Equal Protection 
Clause.  It shielded persons, not groups.  And, it applied symmetrically to all 
individuals.  “The guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when 
applied to one individual and something else when applied to a person of 
another color.  If both are not accorded the same protection, then it is not 
equal.”49  These principles required courts to subject all racial classifications to 
the same high degree of scrutiny.  Justice Powell wrote, “It is far too late to 
argue that the guarantee of equal protection to all persons permits the 
recognition of special wards entitled to a degree of protection greater than that 
accorded others.”50  According to Justice Powell, racial classifications were 
suspect whether race was used to harm, or to help, African-Americans.  As 
such, all racial classifications should receive strict judicial scrutiny.51  They 
could only be upheld if the state could show its purpose was “constitutionally 
permissible and substantial” and that the classification was necessary to 
achieve that end.52 
The University had advanced four rationales to support its set-aside.  
Justice Powell found that three of the University’s proffered justifications 
failed to satisfy strict scrutiny.  First, the University had argued that its 
program would reduce “‘the historic deficit of traditionally disfavored 
minorities in medical schools and in the medical profession.’”53  Justice Powell 
rejected this rationale on the grounds that a preference based on race or ethnic 
grounds alone was facially invalid,54 at least if it was tied to “some specified 
percentage of a particular group.”55 
 
rather than as a defeat for use of race in admissions decisions.  See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, 
BEHIND BAKKE: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND THE SUPREME COURT 96 (1988).  Professor 
Schwartz described Justice Powell’s position as a “crucial concession.”  Id.  In contrast, Justice 
Powell’s biographer disputes the characterization: “Brennan’s intervention led Powell to do 
exactly what he wanted to do anyway—split the difference between goals and quotas.”  JOHN C. 
JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 487 (1994). 
 49. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289-90. 
 50. Id. at 295. 
 51. Id. at 291.  Justice White joined this portion of Justice Powell’s opinion.  Id. at 387 n.7. 
 52. Id. at 305. 
 53. Id. at 306 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 32, Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 
265 (No. 76-811)). 
 54. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307.  Justice Powell wrote: 
If petitioner’s purpose is to assure within its student body some specified percentage of a 
particular group merely because of its race or ethnic origin, such a preferential purpose 
must be rejected not as insubstantial but as facially invalid.  Preferring members of any 
one group for no reason other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination for its own sake.  
This the Constitution forbids. 
Id.  Or, as the Ninth Circuit has put it, “[p]ure (or, if you will, impure) percentages used for their 
own sake are not proper.”  Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188, 1197 (9th Cir. 
2000).  But see Robert M. O’Neil, Racial Preference and Higher Education: The Larger Context, 
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The University’s second rationale, “countering the effects of societal 
discrimination,”56 addressed a “legitimate and substantial interest” so long as 
the discrimination in question was “identified.”57  The modifier, however, 
proved fatal.  Justice Powell suggested three procedural requirements that must 
be met before racial preferences could be used to remedy past societal 
discrimination.  First, there must have been a finding of a constitutional or 
statutory violation.58  Second, the finding had to have been made by an 
authoritative government institution, specifically a judicial, legislative or 
administrative body.59  Finally, remedial action based on such a finding usually 
remained subject to “continuing oversight” to minimize the impact on other 
innocent persons who were competing for the benefit in question.60  In Justice 
Powell’s view, “[t]o hold otherwise would be to convert a remedy heretofore 
reserved for violations of legal rights into a privilege that all institutions 
throughout the Nation could grant at their pleasure to whatever groups are 
perceived as victims of societal discrimination.”61  A university was 
incompetent to make such findings because its mission was education, not 
formulating legislative policy or adjudicating claims.62 
Justice Powell also rejected the third of the University’s rationales, that its 
program would improve the delivery of medical services to underserved 
minority communities by providing more minority physicians who presumably 
would administer to their needs.63  A better health care delivery system 
presumably could “in some situations” be a compelling interest, but Justice 
Powell found “virtually no evidence in the record” suggesting that the Davis 
plan was needed or was designed to achieve that end.64  There were other ways 
to produce physicians inclined to serve disadvantaged communities.65 
 
60 VA. L. REV. 925, 942-43 (1974) (discussing the need for more minorities at campuses and in 
professions relative to numbers in the population). 
 55. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307. 
 56. Id. at 306. 
 57. Id. at 307. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 308. 
 61. Id. at 310. 
 62. Id. at 309.  Moreover, the University had made no such findings.  Id.  See also Hopwood 
v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 942 (5th Cir. 1996) (reasoning that Justice Powell had found societal 
discrimination was “never [an] appropriate” basis for race preference).  But see Kenneth L. Karst 
& Harold W. Horowitz, Affirmative Action and Equal Protection, 60 VA. L. REV. 955, 967-68 
(1974) (defending societal discrimination as a rationale for racial preferences). 
 63. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 310. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 310-11.  Some have misconstrued this rationale as the “role model” justification.  
See, e.g., Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 942.  Cf. Terrance Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Higher 
Education: Political Responsibility and the Judicial Role, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 653 (1975) 
(discussing the idea that more minority lawyers are needed to serve minorities). 
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Justice Powell did recognize the fourth of the University’s rationales, 
“attainment of a diverse student body,” as both permissible and compelling.66  
This interest was anchored in the First Amendment, involved decisions within 
the University’s domain and competence, and applied to undergraduate and 
graduate education.67  Although the interest was sufficiently weighty to justify 
a racial classification, the particular approach the Davis plan took was not 
“necessary to promote this interest.”68  The Davis plan was defective in two 
respects.  First, it misconceived the “nature of the state interest that would 
justify consideration of race or ethnic background.”69  The proper diversity 
interest was not focused exclusively on race but recognized it as one 
characteristic among many relevant traits.  Race or ethnicity could constitute a 
plus factor, but only when measured against a range of other qualities 
including “exceptional personal talents, unique work or service experience, 
leadership potential, maturity, demonstrated compassion, a history of 
overcoming disadvantage, ability to communicate with the poor, or other 
qualifications deemed important.”70  Moreover, the two-track Davis plan 
involved a quota that excluded white applicants from competing for some 
seats.71  By contrast, the Harvard College plan avoided these defects.  It 
considered race as one factor in creating a diverse student body.  It treated race 
or ethnicity as plus factors in a competition for all available spots in which 
other diversity interests were also recognized.72  Such a plan treated “each 
applicant as an individual in the admissions process,”73 not “as a mere stand-in 
for some favorite group.”74  An unsuccessful candidate would not have been 
excluded from “all consideration” for a place based on race or nationality, but 
rather because his or her complete qualifications, including subjective ones, 
were outweighed by those of others.75  Justice Powell endorsed the Harvard 
College plan as a model.76 
In Bakke, Justice Powell defined student body diversity as related entirely 
to what happened on the campus.  Universities should be able to choose 
students to foster a “robust exchange of ideas.”77  This desired characteristic of 
universities was implicit in academic freedom, a value Justice Powell anchored 
 
 66. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311. 
 67. Id. at 311-14. 
 68. Id. at 314-15. 
 69. Id. at 315. 
 70. Id. at 317. 
 71. See Bakke, 483 U.S. at 274-76. 
 72. Id. at 317. 
 73. Id. at 318. 
 74. Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188, 1197 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 75. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318. 
 76. Id. at 316-18. 
 77. Id. at 313. 
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in the First Amendment.  He cited eminent universities, like Harvard and 
Princeton, which celebrated the value of diversity, racial, ethnic, and other 
sorts, to create a climate conducive to such an exchange.  Ironically, at the 
Court’s conference on Bakke, Justice Powell had apparently appreciated a 
broader purpose in diversity: “Diversity is a necessary goal to assure a broad 
spectrum of Americans an opportunity for graduate school.”78  If Justice 
Brennan’s conference notes accurately captured Justice Powell’s comments, he 
seemed to be recognizing an instrumental purpose of diversity to develop more 
minority physicians, not simply to create a pluralistic campus. 
In his opinion, however, Justice Powell defended campus diversity solely 
as a means to allow universities to pursue their educational missions.  He did 
not endorse the use of race in university admissions as a way to produce a 
diverse pool of professionals and leaders.  If anything, his opinion seemed to 
reject that rationale, at least as presented by the University.  On the contrary, it 
saw the long-term value of a diverse student body as a way to give 
professionals the benefit of exposure to different people and ideas.79  Put 
differently, the University needed minority students not to increase the pool of 
minority doctors, but rather so that those students otherwise studying there 
would reap the benefits of a heterogeneous environment. 
Justice Brennan, and those who joined his opinion,80 parted company with 
Justice Powell in crucial respects.  First, they rejected the idea that the 
Constitution was color-blind, a concept that was aspirational at best but needed 
to yield to circumstances.81  Second, they concluded that the concerns that led 
the Court to categorize malevolent racial classifications as suspect did not 
apply to those that served a remedial purpose.  Justice Brennan recognized that 
“racial classifications established for ostensibly benign purposes can be 
misused”82 and accordingly thought a rational basis standard imposed too 
 
 78. THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940-1985), at 740 (Del Dickson ed., 2001). 
 79. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313 (“the ‘nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through 
wide exposure’ to the ideas and mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many peoples”) 
(quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)); id. at 313-
14 (quoting Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950), regarding the importance of exposure to 
diverse viewpoints at law school).  According to Justice Powell: 
Physicians serve a heterogeneous population.  An otherwise qualified medical student 
with a particular background—whether it be ethnic, geographic, culturally advantaged or 
disadvantaged—may bring to a professional school of medicine experiences, outlooks, 
and ideas that enrich the training of its student body and better equip its graduates to 
render with understanding their vital service to humanity. 
Id. at 314. 
 80. Justices White, Marshall and Blackmun joined Justice Brennan’s opinion.  Each also 
wrote his own separate statement. 
 81. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 327 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the 
judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 82. Id. at 361. 
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lenient a filter.83  Such racial classifications should be subjected to 
intermediate scrutiny, which would require that a benign racial classification 
serve an important governmental objective and be substantially related to those 
goals.84  Moreover, race classifications must not stigmatize any group.85  The 
Court’s review should be “strict and searching” but not necessarily as fatal as 
strict scrutiny was.86  Further, Justice Brennan thought that the Davis plan’s 
purpose of “remedying the effects of past societal discrimination” passed 
muster under the Equal Protection Clause.87  Whereas Justice Powell argued 
that this rationale required findings by an authoritative governmental body, 
Justice Brennan articulated the following broad principle: 
[A] state government may adopt race-conscious programs if the purpose of 
such programs is to remove the disparate racial impact its actions might 
otherwise have and if there is reason to believe that the disparate impact is 
itself the product of past discrimination, whether its own or that of society at 
large.88 
The Brennan four joined Justice Powell’s more limited conclusion that 
race could be a factor in admissions decisions, but on altogether different 
grounds.  Indeed, they carefully qualified their endorsement of his rationale.  
They never mentioned “diversity.”  Rather, Justice Brennan’s opinion, in a 
single grudging footnote, conceded that the Harvard College plan was 
“constitutional under our approach, at least so long as the use of race to 
achieve an integrated student body is necessitated by the lingering effects of 
past discrimination.”89  Their approach advanced an altogether different 
rationale for race-conscious admissions decisions.  They saw it as an 
appropriate remedy to compensate for disadvantages that past discrimination 
and prejudice imposed on blacks.  This compensatory rationale resonates 
throughout the Brennan opinion.90 
 
 83. Id. at 358. 
 84. Id. at 359. 
 85. Id. at 361. 
 86. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 361-62. 
 87. Id. at 362.  The rationale was “sufficiently important to justify the use of race-conscious 
admissions programs where there is a sound basis for concluding that minority 
underrepresentation is substantial and chronic, and that the handicap of past discrimination is 
impeding access of minorities to the Medical School.” Id. 
 88. Id. at 369. 
 89. Id. at 326 n.1.  Justice White did, however, join a paragraph of Justice Powell’s opinion 
that stated “that the State has a substantial interest that legitimately may be served by a properly 
devised admissions program involving the competitive consideration of race and ethnic origin.” 
Id. at 320. 
 90. See, e.g., id. at 325 (speaking of the need “to remedy disadvantages cast on minorities by 
past racial prejudice”); id. at 328 (explaining that Title VI does not preclude “preferential 
treatment of racial minorities as a means of remedying past societal discrimination”); id. at 365 
(citing the “effects of past discrimination” as the cause of lower minority enrollment); id. at 366 
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It would be a gross understatement to suggest that Justice Marshall’s 
separate statement simply echoed Justice Brennan’s emphasis on remedying 
the effects of past discrimination, for Justice Marshall wrote with a passion and 
power absent from Justice Brennan’s opinion.  Justice Brennan was writing to 
attract a sizeable bloc, an enterprise that probably required pulling a few 
punches.91  Justice Marshall had no such ambition,92 and, accordingly, the 
inhibitions that writing to obtain a Court generally impose did not restrain his 
prose.  He was free to articulate his individual slant on the issue.  He 
eloquently recounted the sorry American history of oppression of African-
Americans that legal equality had not redressed: “The position of the Negro 
today in America is the tragic but inevitable consequence of centuries of 
unequal treatment.”93  Universities had the power to “remedy the cumulative 
effects of society’s discrimination by giving consideration to race in an effort 
to increase the number and percentage of Negro doctors.”94  The Fourteenth 
Amendment did not preclude institutions from addressing societal 
discrimination, nor did it require identified individual victims because “the 
racism of our society has been so pervasive that none, regardless of wealth or 
position, has managed to escape its impact.”95  Although most of his opinion 
expressed compensatory rhetoric,96 Justice Marshall sounded a related, but 
different theme, an instrumental rationale.  Abuse of African-Americans had 
 
(stating that race-preference programs are acceptable to address “substantial, chronic minority 
underrepresentation” because of “past racial discrimination”); id. at 368-70, 372 (stating that 
race-conscious efforts are justified to remedy “past discrimination”). 
 91. Justice Brennan had prepared a memorandum to try to persuade Justice Powell to uphold 
the Davis plan.  See SCHWARTZ, supra note 48, at 88.  When that quest proved fruitless, Justice 
Brennan sought to prepare an opinion that would represent not only his views but those of 
Justices White, Marshall and Blackmun.  Id. at 139.  Based on a letter he sent Justice White on 
May 30, 1978, he was least sure his opinion would attract Justice Marshall.  Id.  It is, of course, 
possible that his suggestion to Justice White that Justice Marshall was the least likely to join was 
a strategic gambit to give the appearance that Brennan’s views were closer to White’s than to 
Marshall’s and that some move needed to be made toward Justice Marshall to attract his support.  
Id.  If that was his purpose, it failed.  Justice White responded to Justice Brennan’s draft, which 
“was stronger in its language condemning racial discrimination than the final opinion,” by 
suggesting “‘I am inclined to keep the decibel level as low as possible.  We won’t accomplish 
much by beating a white majority over past ills or by describing what has gone by as a system of 
apartheid.’”  Id. at 139 (quoting Letter from Justice White to Justice Brennan (June 13, 1978)).  
Implicitly, Justice White was cautioning against adopting the rhetoric of Justices Marshall and 
Blackmun’s opinion. 
 92. According to Justice Marshall’s biographer, he “rarely took part in any personal efforts 
to affect outcomes.”  MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 128 (1997). 
 93. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 395. 
 94. Id. at 396. 
 95. Id. at 400. 
 96. See, e.g., id. at 401 (for example, stating “where it is necessary to remedy the effects of 
past discrimination”); id. at 402 (“I do not believe that anyone can truly look into America’s past 
and still find that a remedy for the effects of that past is impermissible.”). 
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kept America from reaching its promise: “The dream of America as the great 
melting pot has not been realized for the Negro; because of his skin color he 
never even made it into the pot.”97  Affirmative action was a strategy to make 
America a truly pluralistic society: “[B]ringing the Negro into the mainstream 
of American life should be a state interest of the highest order.  To fail to do so 
is to ensure that America will forever remain a divided society.”98  Justice 
Marshall wrote, “If we are ever to become a fully integrated society, one in 
which the color of a person’s skin will not determine the opportunities 
available to him or her, we must be willing to take steps to open those doors.”99 
Similarly, Justice Blackmun sounded the instrumental ideal of America.100  
He thought that ways must be found to remedy the lack of minority doctors 
and lawyers for the country to realize “its professed goal of [being] a society 
that is not race conscious.”101  He imagined a time when the United States 
would “reach a stage of maturity” where race preferences would be 
unnecessary: “Then persons will be regarded as persons, and discrimination of 
the type we address today will be an ugly feature of history that is instructive 
but that is behind us.”102  He saw little difference between the Davis and 
Harvard College plan.103  In any event, judges were not competent to design 
admissions programs for universities and, accordingly, should defer to 
academicians:104  “In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of 
race.”105 
B. Bakke Summarized 
Justice Powell’s Bakke opinion recognized the ability of institutions to 
voluntarily use race-conscious admissions plans.  As such, he preserved a 
strategy that was critical to completing Brown’s vision of a society without 
second-class races of citizens.  Ironically, he did so in a manner that departed 
from or ignored Brown’s central premises.  Where Brown celebrated the 
importance of education as a way to allow African-Americans to participate in 
democratic society and to share in the American dream, Justice Powell did not 
 
 97. Id. at 400-01. 
 98. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 396. 
 99. Id. at 401-02. 
 100. See id. at 403-07.  Although Justice Brennan worried that Justice Marshall’s approach 
might be counter-productive, it seems to have played a role in persuading Justice Brennan.  
“There is much to be said for Thurgood’s ‘cruelest irony’ approach,” he wrote.  Memorandum 
from Justice Blackmun (May 1, 1978), quoted in TUSHNET, supra note 92, at 129; see also 
SCHWARTZ, supra note 48, at 129. 
 101. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 403. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 406. 
 104. Id. at 404. 
 105. Id. at 407. 
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embrace or even recognize those goals.  He suggested race preferences were 
compelling in order to transform campuses from homogeneous to diverse 
environments.  Whereas Brown sought to remedy the “feelings of inferiority” 
of a racial minority, Justice Powell’s opinion articulated no such concern; on 
the contrary, the beneficiaries of diversity, under his logic, were primarily 
whites.  Whereas Brown exhibited special solicitude for the feelings of 
African-American children, Justice Powell denied that the Equal Protection 
Clause had any “special wards”106 and thought racial classifications adverse to 
whites should receive the same sort of scrutiny as those disparaging blacks.  
Finally, whereas Brown was at its core a case about race in America, Justice 
Powell’s opinion turned on race only in part.  It struck down the Davis plan’s 
set-aside because of its impact on whites, but held that race could be used as it 
was in the Harvard College plan based on the First Amendment interests of 
universities. 
C. Post-Bakke Jurisprudence 
For almost a quarter century after Bakke, the subject of racial preferences 
in college and university admissions did not return to the Court.  The Court did 
address the constitutionality of racial preferences in other areas.  Those 
decisions took a somewhat meandering path marked often by indecision and 
division.  Much of that story is not directly relevant here.  Several features 
characterized the Court’s jurisprudence which do, however, relate to Grutter 
and Gratz. 
First, Bakke ushered in an era of some uncertainty.107  Many universities 
imitated the Harvard College plan that Justice Powell endorsed.108  Yet, the 
Court refused to embrace either Justice Powell’s or Justice Brennan’s 
rationales generally, and Bakke’s status as law remained controversial.109 
Second, the Court ultimately concluded that the Court should apply strict 
scrutiny to all racial preferences, whether designed to hurt or help racial 
minorities and whether enacted by federal or state government.  The Court 
reached that destination after some indecision.  In cases following soon after 
Bakke, only a plurality favored strict scrutiny, and, as late as 1990, a majority 
did apply intermediate review in one case involving a federal affirmative 
 
 106. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 295.  This passage outraged Justice Marshall who regarded it as 
racist.  See TUSHNET, supra note 92, at 128. 
 107. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 304-15 (1985). 
 108. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316-18. 
 109. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 492 (1980) (“This opinion does not 
adopt, either expressly or implicitly, the formulas of analysis articulated in such cases as 
[Bakke].”).  See generally Gabriel J. Chin, Bakke to the Wall: The Crisis of Bakkean Diversity, 4 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 881, 925, 925 n.192 (1996) (collecting sources questioning Bakke’s 
status). 
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action plan.110  The addition of Justice Thomas to the Court in 1992 shifted the 
balance on this issue and, in 1995, the Court held that strict scrutiny applied to 
all racial classifications.111  Although a sizeable bloc on the Court has always 
contended that the Court should scrutinize classifications that benefit 
minorities less strictly than those that disparage them,112 every justice on the 
Court during the past quarter century has agreed that even benevolent racial 
classifications require some heightened scrutiny.113 
Third, the contours of strict scrutiny in this area were drawn largely by 
Justice O’Connor.  Her opinion in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, which 
drew upon her jurisprudence of the prior decade, recognized strict scrutiny as 
the governing standard.114  The Court, she wrote, had established three general 
propositions pertinent to the problem.  Governmental racial classifications 
should be viewed: (1) with skepticism; (2) consistently, whether favoring or 
disadvantaging minorities; and, (3) congruently, whether imposed by federal or 
state government.115  Thus, “any person, of whatever race,” was entitled to 
have any governmental racial classification examined “under the strictest 
judicial scrutiny.”116  Strict scrutiny was designed to consider “relevant 
differences” between asserted justifications and the necessity of classification 
used “to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate uses of race in governmental 
decisionmaking.”117  As such, strict scrutiny was not inevitably fatal to the 
classification at issue.118 
Finally, the Court did not easily find that affirmative action plans satisfied 
strict scrutiny.  It had endorsed racial preferences as a remedy for past 
discrimination attributed to a particular wrongdoer or group of offenders, but 
had generally rejected other grounds.  In Adarand, it overturned Metro 
Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC, the one post-Bakke case to recognize diversity as a 
legitimate governmental objective.119  The Court’s rejection of Metro 
Broadcasting rested on other grounds,120 but, in her Metro Broadcasting 
 
 110. See Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990). 
 111. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
 112. See, e.g., id. at 243-49 (Stevens and Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting); Richmond v. J.A. Croson 
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 535-36 (1989) (Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting); Fullilove, 
448 U.S. at 517-19 (Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring). 
 113. See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. 2411, 2442-45 (2003) (Ginsburg, Souter, and 
Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (applying intermediate scrutiny); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 362-63 (Brennan, 
White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) 
(applying intermediate scrutiny). 
 114. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227. 
 115. Id. at 223-24. 
 116. Id. at 224. 
 117. Id. at 228. 
 118. Id. at 230, 237. 
 119. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227. 
 120. See id. at 225-27. 
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dissent, Justice O’Connor demonstrated little respect for a diversity rationale in 
the context there presented:121 “The interest in increasing the diversity of 
broadcast viewpoints is clearly not a compelling interest,”122 she wrote.  And 
several justices, including Justice O’Connor, arguably thought racial 
classifications were only justifiable in “remedial settings.”123  Although some 
correctly predicted Justice O’Connor would swing different ways in the two 
cases,124 some of her affirmative action opinions should have given Michigan 
Law School some pause.  She had consistently held that the Court should 
strictly scrutinize affirmative action plans125 and, in a different context, had 
suggested that diversity was not a compelling interest.126  Moreover, she had 
expressed misgivings about the use of goals in affirmative action cases.127  
Finally, Justice O’Connor had previously written that, to survive strict scrutiny, 
a racial classification had to “fit with greater precision than any alternative 
remedy”128 and had criticized a decision-maker for not “expressly evaluat[ing] 
the available alternative remedies.”129 
IV.  GRUTTER AND GRATZ 
A. The Cases Summarized 
In Grutter, the Court reviewed a challenge to the University of Michigan 
Law School’s admission program.  The Law School policy articulated a 
 
 121. But see Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Bakke’s Fate, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1745, 
1759-67 (1996) (distinguishing university from broadcast diversity). 
 122. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 612 (1990). 
 123. See id. at 613 (O’Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia and 
Kennedy, JJ.) (explaining that the remedying effects of racial discrimination was the only 
compelling interest); Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (O’Connor, J., 
joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Kennedy, J.).  But see Adarand, 515 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J. 
concurring) (rejecting remedial justification); Croson, 488 U.S. at 520-21 (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(same). 
 124. See, e.g., Susan Low Bloch, Affirmative Action: The Aftermath of the University of 
Michigan Cases, FEDERAL LAWYER, Oct. 2003, at 22, 25.  Cf. Evan Caminker, A Glimpse Behind 
and Beyond Grutter, 48 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 894-95. 
 125. See, e.g., Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227; Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94 (plurality); United 
States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 196-97 (1987) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (endorsing strict 
scrutiny); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 285-86 (1986) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (same). 
 126. Metro Broad., Inc., 497 U.S. at 612 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“The interest in 
increasing the diversity of broadcast viewpoints is clearly not a compelling interest.”); see also 
Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 945 n.27 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Justice O’Connor as 
unreceptive to student diversity). 
 127. See, e.g., Paradise, 480 U.S. at 197; Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 496-
97 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 128. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 199. 
 129. Id. at 201. 
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commitment to achieving a diverse student body to enhance the education 
offered.  To that end, it recognized various bases of diversity admission while 
reaffirming the Law School’s long-standing commitment to racial and ethnic 
diversity, especially with respect to students who had been “historically 
discriminated against” including African-Americans, Hispanics and Native 
Americans.130  In reviewing approximately thirty-five hundred applications for 
three hundred places, the Michigan plan considered not only grade point 
average and Law School Admission Test (LSAT) scores, but other criteria 
including letters of recommendation, the quality of the undergraduate 
institution, the applicant’s essay, and undergraduate courses taken.131  It sought 
to enroll a “critical mass” of under-represented minorities without identifying 
any prescribed number.132  Barbara Grutter, a white female applicant, claimed 
that despite her superior qualifications she was denied admission because the 
Law School gave preference to other prospective students based on their race. 
In Gratz, two unsuccessful white applicants challenged the University of 
Michigan’s refusal to admit them as violative of the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment and of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.133  
The University used a variety of measures to assign numerical scores to 
applicants.  Although the approaches varied in different years, the effect was to 
admit certain minority students whose scores would not have indicated 
admission had they been Caucasian.134 
In her opinion for the Court in Grutter, Justice O’Connor recounted Justice 
Powell’s Bakke opinion at length.135  Justice O’Connor followed Justice Powell 
in several of his basic premises.  Like Justice Powell, she thought the 
Fourteenth Amendment protects persons, not groups.136  She shared his 
conviction that the Constitution treated racial classifications in a consistent 
manner regardless of their purpose.  She followed him, and intervening 
precedent as well, in concluding that strict scrutiny applied whenever the Court 
considered the propriety of a racial classification.137  Such a classification was 
not inevitably invalid.138  Rather, a racial category could be upheld if it served 
a compelling state interest through a means that was narrowly tailored to 
achieve that end.  Ultimately Justice O’Connor did not rely on Bakke as 
binding precedent, but instead endorsed Justice Powell’s conclusion that a 
 
 130. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2332 (2003). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 2333. 
 133. Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2417 (2003). 
 134. Id. at 2419. 
 135. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2335-37. 
 136. Id. at 2337. 
 137. Id. at 2337-38. 
 138. Id. at 2338. 
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diverse student body was a compelling enough interest to allow universities to 
consider race in deciding whom to admit.139 
Michigan Law School had defended its use of race in admissions based 
solely upon “the educational benefits that flow from student body diversity,”140 
a strategy Bakke, no doubt, influenced.  In Grutter, Justice O’Connor 
concluded that Michigan’s diversity rationale constituted a compelling state 
interest.141  In part, the Court deferred to the Law School’s academic 
judgments that were within its particular expertise: “[A]ttaining a diverse 
student body is at the heart of the Law School’s proper institutional 
mission.”142  A diverse student body creates a range of educational benefits, 
including a richer classroom environment and improved understanding among 
the races, all of which better prepares students for an increasingly diverse 
workplace and society.143  Justice O’Connor also identified other benefits from 
student body diversity that were independent of its impact on the campus.  
Citing an amicus brief of civilian and uniformed leaders of America’s 
military,144 the Court concluded that the military required a “‘racially diverse 
officer corps’” to provide for national security.145  The military could only 
attract the requisite diverse mix of officers if military academies and 
universities with Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) used race-conscious 
admissions criteria.146  Similarly, American corporations needed a pool of 
employees capable of interacting successfully in a multicultural global 
economy.147  Because education was the foundation of citizenship and civic 
participation, “public institutions of higher education must be accessible to all 
individuals regardless of race or ethnicity.”148  Finally, law schools must be 
open to qualified members of all races so that professional and leadership 
opportunities will be available to all.149 
 
 139. Id. at 2337 (“We do not find it necessary to decide whether Justice Powell’s opinion is 
binding [precedent].”).  Michigan Law School had argued, at length, that Bakke should be applied 
under the factors identified in the plurality opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).  Brief for Respondent at 17-21, Grutter, 123 S. Ct. 
2325 (No. 02-241). 
 140. Id. at 14. 
 141. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 2339-40. 
 144. Consolidated Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al. at 27, Grutter, 123 S. Ct. 2325 
(Nos. 02-241, 02-516). 
 145. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2340 (quoting Consolidated Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr. 
et al. at 27, Grutter, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (Nos. 02-241, 02-516)). 
 146. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2340. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 2340-41. 
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The Court found that Michigan’s racial preference was narrowly tailored to 
its goal of creating a diverse student body.  Michigan’s program used race in a 
“flexible, nonmechanical” way.150  It did not involve a quota system but used 
race simply as a plus factor in an individualized assessment in which no 
applicant was insulated from a competition with all other candidates.  Race 
was only one of many diversity factors that Michigan considered in making 
admissions decisions.151  Michigan Law School did not “limit in any way the 
broad range of qualities and experiences that may be considered valuable 
contributions to student body diversity.”152  On the contrary, “the Law School 
actually gives substantial weight to diversity factors besides race.”153  Further, 
the Law School had considered various race-neutral alternatives—a lottery, 
reducing academic standards, and percentage plans—all of which proved to be 
inferior approaches.  Finally, Justice O’Connor articulated a requirement that 
the duration of the race preference be limited:154  “We expect that 25 years 
from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further 
the interest approved today.”155 
In Gratz, the Court struck down the University of Michigan’s 
undergraduate admissions program.  It varied in different years.  In essence, for 
several years, the program evaluated applicants based on adjusted grade point 
average and standardized test scores.  These scores were then placed on a grid 
that dictated the admission decision.  Different grids were used for minority 
and nonminority students.156  Beginning in 1998, applicants were ranked on a 
one hundred fifty-point index, with one hundred points required for admission.  
Members of under-represented minorities were given twenty points.157 
Again applying strict scrutiny and bound by Grutter’s holding that student 
body diversity was a compelling interest, the Court held that Michigan’s plan 
 
 150. Id. at 2342. 
 151. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2344 (stating that “all factors that may contribute to student body 
diversity are meaningfully considered alongside race in admissions decisions”). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. The idea of a durational limit was not new.  During the Bakke conference on December 
9, 1977, Justice Stevens remarked that preferences should be temporary devices that would only 
be needed for a few more years.  Justice Marshall replied that they would be needed for another 
one hundred years.  See JEFFRIES, supra note 48, at 487; TUSHNET, supra note 92, at 127.  Justice 
Blackmun suggested in his opinion that such programs might need to last for a decade.  Regents 
of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 403 (1978).  Some court insiders suggested Justice 
Stevens might have joined an opinion endorsing racial preferences for a limited time but was put 
off by Justice Marshall’s response.  See THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra note 78, at 
740 n.253. 
 155. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2347. 
 156. Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2418-19 (2003). 
 157. Id. at 2419. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
920 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48:899 
was not narrowly tailored to serve that interest.158  The plan did not provide for 
the “individualized consideration” that Justice Powell required in Bakke.  
Instead, the twenty-point bump based simply on race was likely to prove 
decisive.159 
B. Grutter-Gratz Assessed 
Cases dealing with race preferences in admissions tend to raise three 
questions.  First, what level of scrutiny is appropriate?  Second, what ends can 
justify such programs?  Third, what means can universities use to achieve 
those ends?  Grutter-Gratz raised these issues and went beyond Bakke in 
significant ways.  Together they flexed the strict scrutiny standard, recognized 
additional rationales for universities to use race preferences, and redrew the 
lines Bakke had suggested defining permissible and illegal plans.  The first and 
third issues are discussed in this section; the second, addressing justifications, 
is the subject of Section V. 
1. Strict Scrutiny 
Courts classically used strict scrutiny to examine racial classifications that 
discriminated against racial minorities.  Strict scrutiny therefore imposed upon 
those defending a classification a heavy burden of justification.160  If rigidly 
applied, the test constrained governmental actions by allowing government to 
use a suspect classification only to serve a compelling interest when there is no 
other way to achieve that end.  It also smokes out illicit purposes by requiring 
that such classifications fit closely to the compelling interest.161  A gap 
between means and ends suggests that the asserted compelling interest was not 
the true justification, that the proffered rationale was a subterfuge for some 
discriminatory purpose.  Statutes and practices discriminating against racial 
minorities have presented the paradigmatic cases in which courts used strict 
scrutiny.  Characteristically, the Court during the last half-century or so struck 
down such classifications.  On the rare occasions when it failed to do so, the 
Court generally displayed great deference to military authorities, accepted 
national security as a compelling interest, and misapplied the test by not 
requiring a very close fit between means and ends.162  In Bakke, Justice Powell 
 
 158. Id. at 2426-27. 
 159. Id. at 2428. 
 160. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357 (Brennan, J., concurring in the 
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“[A] government practice or statute which restricts 
‘fundamental rights’ or which contains ‘suspect classifications’ is to be subjected to ‘strict 
scrutiny’ and can be justified only if it furthers a compelling government purpose and, even then, 
only if no less restrictive alternative is available.”). 
 161. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2338 (2003). 
 162. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
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argued that any classification based on race was suspect and warranted strict 
scrutiny163—a position the Court ultimately adopted.164 
Whereas Justice Powell alone in Bakke advocated the use of strict scrutiny 
for racial classifications,165 Justice O’Connor ostensibly carried with her a full 
Court in agreeing on that standard.  Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and 
Breyer joined Justice O’Connor’s Grutter opinion.  The four dissenters166 also 
agreed that strict scrutiny should apply.167  In Gratz, the Grutter dissenters plus 
Justice O’Connor again applied strict scrutiny.  Indeed, Justice O’Connor in 
Grutter, and Chief Justice Rehnquist in his Grutter dissent and Gratz majority 
opinion, used quite similar language and citations to describe the strict scrutiny 
test.  The use of strict scrutiny was not surprising in view of Adarand and 
Justice O’Connnor’s other affirmative action opinions. 
The apparent consensus on strict scrutiny in Grutter-Gratz was misleading.  
The four justices who joined Justice O’Connor’s Grutter opinion did not share 
her commitment to strict scrutiny in this context.  In Grutter, Justice Ginsburg 
noted in a concurrence that because the Law School’s admissions policy 
survived “review under the standards stated in [Adarand]” the Court need not 
“revisit whether all governmental classifications by race, whether designed to 
benefit or to burden a historically disadvantaged group, should be subject to 
the same standard of judicial review.”168  In Gratz, Justice Ginsburg was more 
direct.  She objected that “the Court once again maintains that the same 
 
 163. Justice Powell offered three rationales to support his conclusion.  First, he suggested that 
distinctions based on race are odious and accordingly “inherently suspect.”  Bakke, 438 U.S. at 
290-91.  Even preferences designed to help disadvantaged minorities are so tainted.  It might not 
be clear that a preference was benign, as preferences might “reinforce common stereotypes 
holding that certain groups are unable to achieve success without special protection based on a 
factor having no relationship to individual worth” and preferences imposed costs on innocent 
people like Bakke who bear the cost.  Id. at 298.  Second, he suggested that distinguishing 
between suspect and permitted racial classifications would engage courts in judgments not 
conducive to judicial resolution.  Many minority groups have some grounds for complaint about 
their treatment here.  How do we construct a constitutional test to decide on some principled basis 
which racial or ethnic classifications merit strict scrutiny and which do not?  Courts would have 
to decide which minorities had suffered sufficiently to warrant preference.  Id. at 296-97.  Finally, 
law is supposed to be certain and stable.  The determinations involved would be subject to change 
to accommodate the flow of history, yet “[t]he kind of variable sociological and political analysis 
necessary to produce such rankings simply does not lie within the judicial competence.”  Id. at 
297.  A uniform standard would contribute to those ends whereas a discriminatory test would 
commit the Court to a jurisprudence of perpetual reexamination. 
 164. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
 165. Those who joined Justice Stevens’s opinion avoided the question by limiting their 
decision to statutory grounds.  Bakke, 438 U.S. at 408-21. 
 166. The four dissenters are Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and 
Thomas. 
 167. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2365-66 (2003). 
 168. Id. at 2348 n.1. 
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standard of review controls judicial inspection of all official race 
classifications.”169  Justices Souter and Breyer joined this complaint.  
“Consistency,” which was Justice O’Connor’s own contribution170 loses its 
allure, they suggested, when one considered America’s discriminatory past, 
which continues to cast its shadow over current distribution of resources.171  
Governmental decision-makers can properly distinguish between racial 
classifications used to foster equality and those intended to subordinate, Justice 
Ginsburg contended.172  Justices Ginsburg, Souter, Breyer, and perhaps 
Stevens173 accordingly would prefer to apply different standards to review 
racial classifications depending upon whether they are used to exclude, or 
include, minority groups.  In this stance, they followed the course that four 
members of the Court urged in Bakke.  Although Justice Ginsburg did not 
explicitly endorse a particular standard, her insistence that not all racial 
classifications are the same suggested a gentler standard of review than strict 
scrutiny.  To be sure, she would not give a pass to a “mere assertion of a 
laudable governmental purpose.”174  Accordingly, she would not apply the 
forgiving rational basis standard to racial preference.  She would subject them 
to “careful judicial inspection” and to “[c]lose review.”175  These standards 
suggest some intermediate level of review tougher than mere rationality, but 
more flexible than strict scrutiny. 
The Grutter dissenters were less subtle in their displeasure at the level of 
scrutiny in Grutter.  Chief Justice Rehnquist thought the Court’s claim to apply 
strict scrutiny illusory: “Although the Court recites the language of our strict 
scrutiny analysis, its application of that review is unprecedented in its 
deference.”176  Justice Kennedy was more harsh, suggesting that the Court had 
“manipulated [the strict scrutiny test] to distort its real and accepted 
meaning.”177  In so doing, it “undermine[d] both the test and its own 
controlling precedents.”178  The Court’s review had been “perfunctory,” not 
strict.179 
 
 169. Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2442 (2003). 
 170. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995). 
 171. Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2443. 
 172. Id. at 2444. 
 173. Justice Stevens had drawn this distinction on earlier occasions.  See, e.g., Adarand, 515 
U. S. at 243-45 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) 
(upholding racial classification under intermediate scrutiny with Justice Stevens in the majority). 
 174. Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2445. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2366 (2003); see also id. at 2370 (accusing the 
Court of “an unprecedented display of deference under our strict scrutiny analysis”). 
 177. Id. at 2370. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 2371. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2004] BEYOND BAKKE 923 
Grutter, then, presented an anomalous situation in which four members of 
the Court who joined an opinion based on strict scrutiny did not really believe 
that standard should apply to race preference in admissions.  The Grutter 
dissenters, who believed such plans should be measured against strict scrutiny, 
did not believe the Michigan plan passed muster.  They believed the Court did 
not really apply strict scrutiny to the Michigan Law School program.  Only 
Justice O’Connor both believed strict scrutiny should apply to racial 
classifications benefiting minorities and that Michigan Law School’s program 
satisfied that test. 
On earlier occasions, Justice O’Connor’s colleagues had suggested that she 
exercised a more lenient brand of strict scrutiny.  Indeed, in some respects, her 
strict scrutiny resembled Justice Brennan’s intermediate review as he described 
it in Bakke.  Review of race preferences, he said, should be “strict—not strict 
in theory and fatal in fact,”180 a formulation Justice O’Connor adopted.181  
Justice Scalia had observed that Justice O’Connor’s rendition of strict scrutiny 
showed “that our concepts of equal protection enjoy a greater elasticity than 
the standard categories might suggest.”182  Justices Ginsburg and Breyer 
inferred from Justice O’Connor’s Adarand opinion that strict scrutiny would 
invalidate racial classifications burdening discrete minorities but would not 
inevitably be fatal to those designed to foster equality.183  They applauded her 
reiteration that strict scrutiny separates legitimate from illegitimate uses of race 
and thought that the decision permitted change to accommodate new 
circumstances.184  Justice O’Connor herself had noted overlap between Justice 
Powell’s formulation of strict scrutiny and the intermediate scrutiny that 
Justice Brennan would apply.  The distinction between “compelling” and 
“important” was “negligible,” she suggested.185  Indeed, in Grutter she 
occasionally used “important.”186  She was careful to emphasize that “[n]ot 
every decision influenced by race is equally objectionable.”187  Strict scrutiny 
was designed “to provide a framework for carefully examining the importance 
and the sincerity of the reasons advanced by the governmental decisionmaker 
for the use of race in that particular context.”188 
 
 180. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 361-62 (1978) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 181. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2338; Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 
(1995). 
 182. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 268. 
 183. Id. at 275 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 184. Id. at 275-76. 
 185. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 286 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 186. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2338. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
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In fact, the Court in Grutter did apply a less rigorous form of strict scrutiny 
than it had in the past.  The Court typically had found compelling only those 
rare justifications that are truly irresistible, like national security,189 remedying 
prior discrimination,190 or vindicating First Amendment values.191  Justice 
O’Connor engaged in a curious methodology in deciding that diversity was 
compelling.  In essence, the Court deferred to the “Law School’s educational 
judgment that such diversity is essential to its educational mission.”192  That 
judgment might be correct and appropriate.  Yet it seems something of an 
oxymoron to claim to be using strict scrutiny even while confessing deference 
to the party being scrutinized.193  Indeed, the predicate of strict scrutiny is that 
the classification being used renders deference inappropriate.194  In Grutter, the 
Court deferred in identifying the compelling interest and in measuring the 
fit.195 
Moreover, the Court’s presumption of the good faith of the University196 
also departed from strict scrutiny.  Strict scrutiny presumes that racial 
classifications are invalid and makes the government prove its good faith by 
showing a compelling interest and a close fit.  Indeed, elsewhere, Justice 
O’Connor stated that strict scrutiny is applied to “smoke out illegitimate uses 
of race.”197  But how can strict scrutiny smoke out illegitimate uses of race if 
the good faith of the user is presumed?  Acknowledging good faith of 
universities might be appropriate, but it seems at odds with strict scrutiny. 
Justice O’Connor recognized this problem, but her response was 
unconvincing: 
Our scrutiny of the interest asserted by the Law School is no less strict for 
taking into account complex educational judgments in an area that lies 
primarily within the expertise of the university.  Our holding today is in 
 
 189. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 190. See, e.g., Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); United States v. Paradise, 
480 U.S. 149 (1987). 
 191. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 192. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339. 
 193. See id. at 2373 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Deference is antithetical to strict scrutiny, not 
consistent with it.”). 
 194. To be sure, the Court deferred heavily to military authorities in Korematsu.  Yet the 
deference was not in deciding that national security was a compelling interest, hardly a 
controversial issue, but rather in deciding the means appropriate to vindicating that interest.  See 
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218-19. 
 195. Justice Kennedy, in dissent, was willing to accept the “objective of racial diversity . . . 
based on empirical data known to us,” but criticized the Court for deferring to the University 
regarding implementation.  See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2370-71. 
 196. Id. at 2339. 
 197. Id. at 2338 (internal quotations omitted). 
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keeping with our tradition of giving a degree of deference to a university’s 
academic decisions, within constitutionally prescribed limits.198 
Justice O’Connor cannot have it both ways.  “Strict scrutiny” and “deference” 
are at opposite ends of the spectrum.  It might be appropriate to defer to a 
university regarding areas within its expertise, but deference is one hundred 
eighty degrees away from strict scrutiny.  School diversity might be a 
compelling goal but, under conventional applications of strict scrutiny, that is a 
judgment for the Court to make and is not one where deference is appropriate. 
The deference to universities might, of course, be grounded in values 
implicit in the First Amendment, as Justice Powell had argued a quarter 
century earlier.  Academic freedom is a “special concern of the First 
Amendment,” he wrote.  “The freedom of a university to make its own 
judgments as to education includes the selection of its student body.”199  A 
university’s judgment that student body diversity promotes education therefore 
finds shelter under the First Amendment.  Justice Powell could view choosing 
a diverse student body as a compelling interest based on this link to First 
Amendment values.200 
It is not clear that the Court leaned heavily on the First Amendment in 
Grutter.  To be sure, Justice O’Connor did note that “[w]e have long 
recognized that, given the important purpose of public education and the 
expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated with the university 
environment, universities occupy a special niche in our constitutional 
tradition.”201  She also observed that Justice Powell, in recognizing student 
body diversity as a compelling interest, “invoked our cases recognizing a 
constitutional dimension, grounded in the First Amendment, of educational 
autonomy.”202  Yet Justice O’Connor never explicitly rested her own 
conclusion on the First Amendment.  Her references to the First Amendment 
cited what the Court or Justice Powell had done in the past; she did not 
explicitly adopt those sources as reflecting the Grutter Court’s interpretation.  
And her clincher, which followed these citations, did not depend on the First 
Amendment.  Instead, it rested her conclusion that diversity is a compelling 
interest on (1) “our view that attaining a diverse student body is at the heart of 
the Law School’s proper institutional mission” and (2) a presumption of good 
faith.203 
 
 198. Id. at 2339. 
 199. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978). 
 200. Justice Kennedy criticized the Court for abandoning “rigorous judicial review,” which he 
associated with Justice Powell’s Bakke approach.  Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2370.  Of course, Justice 
Powell did not need to measure the implementation of the Harvard College plan, which he 
approved but that was not before the Court. 
 201. Id. at 2339. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id.  Justice O’Connor noted: 
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The Court seemed, then, to be placing a lower hurdle for racial 
classifications benefiting minorities in admissions decisions than on those 
burdening them.  A thought experiment helps test this proposition.204  Imagine 
that a particular law school determined that student diversity would be served 
by admitting fewer Jewish, Asian-American, or, for that matter, African-
American students and that the same institution designed a narrowly tailored 
Harvard College-type program to serve that end.  Would the Court have 
deferred to such a policy to advance the compelling interest of student 
diversity in the narrowly tailored way here hypothesized?  For Justice 
O’Connor to perform her strict scrutiny test consistently she would need to 
assess such a plan by asking whether campus diversity was a compelling 
interest and whether the minority restriction was narrowly tailored.  Yet it is 
possible that such a program would be invalidated as a per se violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause without running it through the justificatory screen.205  
If this prediction is correct, it suggests that in fact the Grutter majority would 
treat differently preferences that benefit minorities from those that burden 
them.206  This is as it should be.  Ultimately, Justice O’Connor’s decision to 
relax the strict scrutiny in Grutter is appropriate because racial preferences 
favoring minorities do not deserve the same degree of suspicion as do those 
burdening them. 
Racial preferences for minorities find their justification on entirely 
different grounds than do those for whites.  Minority preferences relate to 
disadvantages attributable to a history of oppression that compromise the 
ability of some minorities to compete and accordingly leave them under-
represented on campuses and in various leadership and professional cohorts.207  
As Justice Marshall wrote in Bakke, “It is because of a legacy of unequal 
treatment that we now must permit the institutions of this society to give 
 
Our conclusion that the Law School has a compelling interest in a diverse student body is 
informed by our view that attaining a diverse student body is at the heart of the Law 
School’s proper institutional mission, and that “good faith” on the part of a university is 
“presumed” absent “a showing to the contrary.” 
Id. 
 204. Cf. DWORKIN, supra note 107, at 313-14. 
 205. Indeed, Justices Ginsburg and Souter seemed to count the fact that a program favored 
disadvantaged groups and was not designed “to limit or decrease enrollment by any particular 
racial or ethnic group” as an important factor in assessing it.  See Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 
2411, 2445 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 206. Cf. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2361 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(referring to the Court’s “implicit rejection of [the idea] that beneficial and burdensome racial 
classifications are equally invalid”). 
 207. See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2443 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“This 
insistence on ‘consistency’ would be fitting were our Nation free of the vestiges of rank 
discrimination long reinforced by law.”) (citations omitted). 
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consideration to race in making decisions about who will hold the positions of 
influence, affluence, and prestige in America.”208 
Preferences in favor of minorities, unlike their predecessors, do not reflect 
racial prejudice.  Benevolent motives—to achieve campus diversity, to redress 
past wrongs, and to create a more pluralistic society—inform them.  What 
makes racial classifications suspect is not that race is immutable.  It is rather 
that such distinctions have historically reflected stereotypes based on 
prejudice.209  There is a difference between programs of exclusion and those of 
inclusion,210 or, in Justice Stevens’s formulation, “between a ‘No Trespassing’ 
sign and a welcome mat.”211 
Finally, the reason to view race as a suspect classification does not apply 
when a minority is the beneficiary.  Prejudice against “discrete and insular 
minorities” might distort the fair operation of “those political processes 
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities.”212  White majorities might 
discriminate against “discrete and insular minorities” who might not be able to 
form coalitions to defend their interests.  Majorities do not face the same risks.  
As John Hart Ely explained: 
There is no danger that the coalition that makes up the white majority in our 
society is going to deny to whites generally their right to equal concern and 
respect.  Whites are not going to discriminate against all whites for reasons of 
racial prejudice, and neither will they be tempted generally to underestimate 
the needs and deserts of whites relative to those, say, of blacks or to 
overestimate the costs of devising a more finely tuned classification system 
that would extend to certain whites the advantages they are extending to 
blacks.  The function of the Equal Protection Clause . . . is largely to protect 
against substantive outrages by requiring that those who would harm others 
must at the same time harm themselves—or at least widespread elements of the 
constituency on which they depend for reelection.  The argument does not 
work the other way around, however: similar reasoning supports no insistence 
that our representatives cannot hurt themselves, or the majority on whose 
 
 208. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 401 (1978). 
 209. See DWORKIN, supra note 107, at 301. 
 210. See, e.g., Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2434 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 2444 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 316 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 211. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U. S. 200, 245 (1995) (Steven, J. dissenting).  
Paul Freund exposed the difference in a 1964 article.  He wrote: 
There is finally the moral, and it may be the legal, difference between a preference in 
favor of a minority and one against it.  Compare a trust fund donated to a university, the 
income to be used for the education of the descendants of John Hancock, and an unrelated 
fund for the education of anyone except those descendants.  It would not be surprising if 
the governing board of the university felt differently about the two preferences, and 
judges might be animated by the same sense of justice in applying the constitutional 
guarantee of equal protection of the laws. 
PAUL A. FREUND, ON LAW AND JUSTICE 47 (1968). 
 212. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). 
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support they depend, without at the same time hurting others as well.  Whether 
or not it is more blessed to give than to receive, it is surely less suspicious.213 
Ultimately, the argument for a uniform standard is unpersuasive.  The 
notion of a color-blind Constitution might be a pleasing metaphor but “it is not 
a constitutional text.”214  American society is color-conscious, not color-blind, 
and this is a fact that flows inexorably from our history.  Race remains a potent 
defining characteristic.215  To the extent a color-blind Constitution represents 
an aspiration, it can only be achieved by allowing greater tolerance for racial 
preferences that favor minorities than those that subjugate them.216 
Indeed, the call for consistent application of strict scrutiny ignores the fact 
that American history has not been symmetrical.  As Justice Marshall wrote in 
Bakke, “it is more than a little ironic that, after several hundred years of class-
based discrimination against Negroes, the Court is unwillingly to hold that a 
class-based remedy for that discrimination is permissible.”217 
To be sure, deciding which minorities merit preference and for how long 
might involve courts in making difficult judgments, as Justice Powell 
observed.  Yet strict scrutiny does not relieve the judiciary from making these 
same judgments.  Ultimately, it must make them in deciding whether 
justifications for particular preferences are compelling and whether the 
programs used are narrowly tailored.  Moreover, these decisions will 
necessarily evolve over time based on changing historical circumstances. 
Justice O’Connor is correct to apply a kinder, gentler scrutiny to 
admissions classifications designed to benefit disadvantaged minorities.  Yet 
the insistence on the same standard to review both types of classification is 
unfortunate.  It might confuse courts and attorneys involved in litigating the 
standards.  They might understandably take their cues from Justice O’Connor’s 
words rather than her actions. 
Moreover, the symmetrical language obscures the underlying issues at 
stake.  It is not difficult to appreciate the Court’s desire to offer a formal test to 
handle these problems.  Yet the emphasis on standards of review tends to 
divert attention from the underlying principles involved.  Instead of focusing 
on the fundamental differences between racial classifications discriminating 
against blacks and those helping them, the use of a uniform standard tends to 
camouflage these issues behind a formal facade. 
 
 213. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 170-71 
(1980); see also Adarand, 515 U.S. at 247-48 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (distinguishing legislative 
decision to burden the minority from the majority race). 
 214. FREUND, supra note 211, at 45. 
 215. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 107, at 294. 
 216. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J.) 
(“In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race.  There is no other way.  And 
in order to treat some persons equally, we must treat them differently.”). 
 217. Id. at 400. 
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2. Narrowly Tailored 
The Grutter Court’s description of the “narrow tailored” prong suggested 
some flexing of that requirement as well.  Bakke had established that race as 
used in the Harvard College plan was acceptable but set-asides were not.  
Bakke did not say, however, whether the Harvard approach touched the outer 
limit of constitutionality or whether mechanical approaches short of quotas 
were also within constitutional bounds.218  In Bakke, Justice Powell rather 
easily found the Davis plan’s sixteen-place set-aside was not narrowly tailored.  
Conversely, he found a plan, like Harvard’s, which used race as a plus factor, 
constitutionally sufficient.  Yet the University of California-Davis had not 
implemented the Harvard College’s plan, and Harvard’s conduct was not 
before the Court.  Justice Powell accordingly could address the contours of the 
Harvard College plan without examining its application. 
In Grutter, the parties litigated a Harvard-like plan and its implementation.  
Grutter-Gratz moved the lines Bakke had set in both directions.  Gratz made 
clear that not only quotas but also mechanical allotments of substantial points 
were not narrowly tailored.  The “automatic” award of points was a defective 
system because it was not individualized and because it tended to be outcome-
determinative.219  Gratz thereby tightened the fit requirement.  On the other 
hand, Grutter stretched a bit the extent to which schools could use targets. The 
Harvard College plan had renounced using “set target-quotas” but 
acknowledged the need to pay “some attention to numbers” so that minorities 
would not be isolated.220  Justice O’Connor made clear that a school could seek 
a “critical mass” of minority students without violating the Equal Protection 
Clause.221  It could have “minimum goals for minority enrollment.”222  To that 
end, it could consult daily tracking reports to measure its success in admitting 
minorities.223  Whereas Justice Powell suggested only that the weight given 
race might vary from year to year subject to the characteristics of the student 
body and applicant pool,224 Justice O’Connor implied that more attention 
might be given to race.  A school could give “greater ‘weight’ to race than to 
some other factors, in order to achieve student body diversity,”225 Justice 
O’Connor explained, presumably so long as it did not do so in a way that made 
race or ethnicity “the defining feature”226 of an applicant as had the 
 
 218. See DWORKIN, supra note 107, at 306. 
 219. Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2429-31 (2003).  But see id. at 2432-33 (O’Connor, 
J., concurring) (criticizing the Michigan plan for a lack of “individualized review”). 
 220. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 323. 
 221. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2343 (2003). 
 222. Id. at 2342. 
 223. Id. at 2343. 
 224. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317-18. 
 225. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2342. 
 226. Id. at 2343. 
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undergraduate school in the mechanical approach rejected in Gratz.  To be 
sure, Justice O’Connor emphasized that race could not be the only diversity 
factor valued.  The Law School scored points because it “does not . . . limit in 
any way the broad range of qualities and experiences that may be considered 
valuable contributions to student body diversity.”227  It “gives substantial 
weight to diversity factors besides race,”228 such as foreign travel, community 
service, and overcoming hardship.  The Law School’s program “considers race 
as one factor among many, in an effort to assemble a student body that is 
diverse in ways broader than race.”229 
Justice O’Connor’s method of reviewing implementation suggested that 
the “narrow tailored” requirement allowed deference to the tailor’s judgment 
rather than a close measure of snugness.  She relied essentially on the 
testimony of admissions officers and the fact that the number of minority 
students who matriculated at the Law School varied from year to year.  She 
largely ignored or dismissed evidence that suggested discrepancies in 
implementation.  For instance, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted the large 
disparities between the numbers of African-Americans admitted compared to 
Native-Americans and wondered why the critical mass concept tolerated such 
differences.  He pointed out the close resemblance between the percentage of 
minorities in each group who applied and those admitted.230  Justice Kennedy 
also argued that the consistency in numbers suggested a hidden quota.231 
Regardless of the merits of the debate, Justice O’Connor’s lack of concern 
with these details seemed inconsistent with classic narrow tailoring.  Instead of 
insisting that the Law School show a close fit, she seemed content to take a 
distant view.  Indeed, Justice O’Connor made clear that narrow tailoring was 
not synonymous with the least restrictive alternative analysis.232  The Law 
School must make a “good faith consideration of workable race-neutral 
alternatives,” but it need not exhaust every last possibility nor need it 
compromise standards.233 
The final characteristic of fit involved the projected life span of the 
preferences.  Whereas Bakke was silent regarding the duration of racial 
 
 227. Id. at 2344. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. at 2345. 
 230. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2368. 
 231. Id. at 2371. 
 232. Id. at 2344  (“Narrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of every conceivable race-
neutral alternative.”).  But see id. at 2365 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (explaining that strict 
scrutiny requires that a racial classification fit the compelling interest “‘with greater precision 
than any alternative means’”) (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 
(1986)). 
 233. Id. at 2345. 
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preferences, Grutter said such programs “must be limited in time.”234  Indeed, 
Justice O’Connor used imperative language repeatedly to emphasize the 
mandatory nature of a sunset provision.235  Still, she hedged her bets as to 
when the sun would set.  Contrary to Justice Thomas’s claim, she did not hold 
that race preference plans will end in twenty-five years.  “We expect that 25 
years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to 
further the interest approved today,”236 she wrote.  Her use of “expect” left 
some wriggle room to account for developments during the next quarter 
century.  As Justice Ginsberg put it, the twenty-five year concept was a “hope” 
rather than a “firm forecast.”237 
Justice Thomas’s repeated characterization of the Court’s “holding” that 
race preferences in higher education “will be illegal in 25 years” reflected 
either wishful thinking, sloppy reading, or deliberate distortion.238  Indeed, 
Justice Thomas supported his interpretation of the Court’s decision by a 
parenthetical explanation that the majority “stat[ed] that racial discrimination 
will no longer be narrowly tailored, or ‘necessary to further’ a compelling state 
interest in 25 years.”239  The majority said no such thing.  Justice O’Connor 
prefaced her language with “we expect.”  The verb, which Justice Thomas 
conveniently ignored, controlled the sentence and revealed Justice Thomas’s 
misreading.  By contrast, Chief Justice Rehnquist accurately depicted the 
majority’s language as a tentative suggestion.240 
The approach that the Court endorsed makes it more difficult for judicial 
scrutiny of admissions plans to take place because it requires that such 
decisions consider various subjective factors on a case-by-case basis.  No 
doubt, it will be more difficult and more expensive for admissions offices to do 
their work than it would have been if Gratz had been decided the other way.  
Individual admissions officers might pursue their own agendas and consider 
 
 234. Id. at 2346. 
 235. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2346 (stating that “race-conscious admissions policies must be 
limited in time;” “the requirement that all governmental use of race must have a logical end 
point;” “[t]he requirement that all race-conscious admissions programs have a termination 
point”). 
 236. Id. at 2347. 
 237. Id. at 2348. 
 238. See id. at 2350 (“I agree with the Court’s holding that racial discrimination in higher 
education admissions will be illegal in 25 years.”); id. at 2363-64 (“The Court also holds that 
racial discrimination in admissions should be given another 25 years before it is deemed no 
longer narrowly tailored to the Law School’s fabricated compelling state interest.”); id. at 2364 
(“Nor is the Court’s holding that racial discrimination will be unconstitutional in 25 years made 
contingent on the gap closing in that time.”); id. at 2365 (“I therefore can understand the 
imposition of a 25-year time limit only as a holding . . . .”). 
 239. Id. at 2350-51. 
 240. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2369-70 (“The Court suggests a possible 25-year limitation on the 
Law School’s current program.”). 
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race to the exclusion of other forms of diversity.  Yet under the approach the 
Court has approved in Grutter, these activities will take place largely below the 
judicial radar screen and Justice O’Connor has signaled that courts need not 
insist on a skin-tight fit to accept a plan. 
V.  THE RATIONALE FOR RACE PREFERENCES 
Grutter is most significant for the way it might transform the debate about 
the justifications of race preferences.  Justice O’Connor expanded Justice 
Powell’s student diversity rationale to incorporate instrumental goals.  
Whereas Justice Powell saw diversity essentially as a means to enhance 
campus discussion, Justice O’Connor saw it as a way also to achieve basic 
American ideals regarding a racially pluralistic society.  In order to appreciate 
the contributions that Grutter makes, it is useful to consider the ways in which 
race preferences have been justified. 
A. Justifying Race Preferences: A Historical View 
The idea that diversity contributes to education is neither new nor 
historically dependent upon the debate about race preferences.  On the 
contrary, long before Bakke, or even Brown, universities appreciated the 
advantages of student body diversity.241  To be sure, early applications of the 
concept did not include race.  Instead, universities defined diversity largely as 
exposure to competing ideas.242  Not surprisingly, proponents of diversity soon 
came to recognize that the vital assortment of ideas would more likely 
characterize a campus that included students from different regional, national, 
economic, and ethnic backgrounds.243  The concept of educational diversity 
was not artificially contrived to justify racial preference.  Rather, it preceded 
race preference as an educational strategy, but eventually expanded to include 
race as a relevant factor. 
Student body diversity was not, however, always the only, or even the 
preferred, rationale for racial preferences in admissions.  Historically, 
proponents advanced two other justifications. First, a compensatory or 
remedial justification grew from the premise that African-Americans have 
historically gotten a bad deal in America, that the history of slavery, Jim Crow, 
and social ostracism have denied them anything approximating a fair and equal 
 
 241. See, e.g., WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER 218-19 (1998) 
(demonstrating that the “concept of diversity is far from new in American higher education”); 
NEIL L. RUDENSTINE, The University and Diversity, in POINTING OUR THOUGHTS: REFLECTIONS 
ON HARVARD AND HIGHER EDUCATION, 1991–2001, at 17 (2001) (collection of addresses and 
essays tracing diversity at Harvard to the mid-Nineteenth Century). 
 242. Neil L. Rudenstine, Diversity and Learning at Harvard: A Historical View, Address to 
the Massachusetts Historical Society (Nov. 6, 1996), in RUDENSTINE, supra note 241, at 23. 
 243. Id. at 24. 
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opportunity.  Racial discrimination is not entirely a vice of the distant past; 
rather “conscious and unconscious race bias, even rank discrimination based 
on race, remain alive in our land, impeding realization of our highest values 
and ideals.”244  The history of unfair treatment has produced disparities 
between the educational attainments and economic status of African-
Americans as compared to white Americans.245  These handicaps have 
undermined the ability of African-Americans to compete.  Racial preference 
was seen as a strategy to remedy that history of abuse, to put African-
Americans in the position they would have been in absent this history of 
mistreatment.246  President Lyndon B. Johnson put it well during his 1965 
address at Howard University.  He said: 
  But freedom is not enough.  You do not wipe away the scars of centuries 
by saying: Now you are free to go where you want, and do as you desire, and 
choose the leaders you please. 
  You do not take a person who, for years, has been hobbled by chains and 
liberate him, bring him up to the starting line of a race and then say, “you are 
free to compete with all the others,” and still justly believe that you have been 
completely fair. 
  Thus it is not enough just to open the gates of opportunity.  All our citizens 
must have the ability to walk through those gates.247 
Compensatory arguments take race into account in at least four different 
contexts.  First, they are offered as a reason for awarding relief to a particular 
plaintiff who was denied something by a particular defendant based upon race.  
This paradigm involves no exceptional remedy; awarding relief to actual 
victims should not be seen as race preference.  Rather, it simply involves 
granting a conventional judicial remedy to redress harm one party has caused 
another.  Indeed, this variation is not controversial and every justice who has 
sat on the Court during the last quarter century (if not longer) would have no 
trouble accepting it.248 
A second form of race sensitivity arises when a candidate’s race might act 
as a surrogate for a set of obstacles overcome.  “It is simply not possible to 
 
 244. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2347-48 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 245. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 395-96 (1978) (Marshall, J.). 
 246. See generaly Frank Askin, The Case for Compensatory Treatment, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 
65 (1969). 
 247. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Address at Howard University, 2 PUB. PAPERS 636 (June 
4, 1965). 
 248. See, e.g., Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 524 (1989) (Scalia, J. concurring) 
(supporting a hypothetical order raising the salaries of black employees in response to past 
discriminatory conduct); see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U. S. 200, 239 (1995) 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that “[i]ndividuals who have been wronged by unlawful racial 
discrimination should be made whole . . . .”). 
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understand how individuals have come to be the people they are without 
considering the elements that have shaped them,” wrote William G. Bowen in 
1977.249  The achievements of a person of color might, in certain instances, 
reflect “a degree of drive and determination that should be given weight in the 
competition for admission.”250  Such relative judgments might be difficult, 
subjective and contested.  Yet analytically the principle is not controversial.  It 
amounts to a judgment that, but for a disadvantage, a particular individual’s 
achievement to date would have been sufficient to merit a benefit.  It might 
also suggest potential for further performance.  As such, this form of race 
preference is fully consistent with a meritocractic system. 
A third type of compensatory argument involves situations where an 
institution or class of institutions has been identified as having discriminated 
based on race in the past.251  Here, racial preference might extend beyond 
victims of that action to others of the same race even though all beneficiaries 
might not have been specific victims.  This paradigm is also widely supported. 
The fourth variation of the compensatory claim is that racial preference is 
merited to address societal discrimination even absent a finding of wrongdoing 
by the institution in question.  This version is controversial.  It was at issue in 
Bakke where it won the endorsement of four justices,252 but was rejected by 
 
 249. WILLIAM G. BOWEN, Admissions and the Relevance of Race, in EVER THE TEACHER: 
WILLIAM G. BOWEN’S WRITINGS AS PRESIDENT OF PRINCETON 422, 430 (1988); see also Brief 
of Massachusetts Institute of Technology et al. at 23, Grutter, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) (Nos. 02-
241, 02-516). 
 250. See BOWEN, supra note 249, at 430.  Justice Douglas took note of this in his dissent in 
DeFunis v. Odegaard: 
A black applicant who pulled himself out of the ghetto into a junior college may thereby 
demonstrate a level of motivation, perseverance, and ability that would lead a fairminded 
admissions committee to conclude that he shows more promise for law study than the son 
of a rich alumnus who achieved better grades at Harvard.  That applicant would be offered 
admission not because he is black, but because as an individual he has shown he has the 
potential, while the Harvard man may have taken less advantage of the vastly superior 
opportunities offered him.  Because of the weight of the prior handicaps, that black 
applicant may not realize his full potential in the first year of law school, or even in the 
full three years, but in the long pull of a legal career his achievements may far outstrip 
those of his classmates whose earlier records appeared superior by conventional criteria. 
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 331 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 251. See, e.g., Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256, 273 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that the 
government can use race preferences to remedy “present effects of past discrimination”); United 
States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 167 (1987) (plurality opinion) (explaining that discriminatory 
conduct created a justification for race-conscious relief). 
 252. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 369 (1978) (Brennan, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part).  According to Justice Brennan: 
Properly construed, therefore, our prior cases unequivocally show that a state government 
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Justice Powell in his decisive opinion: “We have never approved a 
classification that aids persons perceived as members of relatively victimized 
groups at the expense of other innocent individuals in the absence of judicial, 
legislative, or administrative findings of constitutional or statutory 
violations.”253  Justice Powell’s statement suggested two problems.  First, 
remedying societal discrimination was “an amorphous concept of injury that 
may be ageless in its reach into the past.”254  The rationale involved “sheer 
speculation.”255  Second, regardless of the merits of the rationale, universities 
could not address it.  Their business was education; they were not judicial, 
legislative, or administrative institutions.  Accordingly, they were not 
competent to make the requisite findings.256  The societal discrimination 
rationale has never commanded a majority on the Court.  Responding in part 
perhaps to prevailing judicial doctrine, leading universities go out of their way 
to reject it.257  Michigan did not invoke it in Grutter or Gratz and no justice 
wrote an opinion championing it.258 
Justice Powell might have pointed out other problems universities would 
encounter if the societal discrimination compensatory argument was used as 
the basis for race preferences in admissions.  Those who suffered most from 
such discrimination, and accordingly who would have the strongest claim to 
compensation, might not be the best candidates for undergraduate or 
professional schools.  Committing spaces to such candidates might poorly 
allocate precious resources.  This objection might be met by limiting race 
preference as compensation to those who were very qualified.  Such a 
limitation, though entirely sensible, would suggest a criteria other than 
compensation at work.  Moreover, a compensatory approach might not help 
many African-Americans.  Some African-Americans might have a modest, or 
no, claim to compensation based on disadvantage suffered.  Some from other 
backgrounds might have strong claims to have suffered from economic 
 
that the disparate impact is itself the product of past discrimination, whether its own or 
that of society at large.  There is no question that Davis’ program is valid under this test. 
Id. 
 253. Id. at 307. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469, 499 (1989) (O’Connor, J.). 
 256. Bakke, 438 U. S. at 309.  Cf. Thomas Nagel, Equal Treatment and Compensatory 
Discrimination, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 348, 356-58 (1973) (reform of system of rewards beyond 
capacity of educational institutions). 
 257. See, e.g., Brief of Massachusetts Institute of Technology et al. at 23, Grutter v. Bollinger, 
123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) (Nos. 02-241, 02-516) (“Neither MIT nor Stanford makes admission 
decisions to compensate for past wrongs.”). 
 258. To be sure, Justice Ginsburg pointed out an array of disparities between races related to 
past and present discrimination.  But her discussion was largely oriented to contending for a 
lower level of scrutiny for minority preferences rather than supporting the societal discrimination 
rationale.  Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2443-45 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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circumstances, prejudice, or other disadvantage.259  Some groups, who might 
have suffered from discrimination, might be well-represented at universities 
already.  The entire enterprise would be fraught with controversy and would 
put universities in the business of redistributive justice, an activity far from 
their basic mission. 
Alternatively, proponents of racial preferences identify certain 
instrumental justifications that would promote social well-being outside of the 
campus.  The common premise of these arguments is that social utility will 
increase and the world will be a better place if more African-Americans and 
certain other minorities have access to a greater share of society’s resources.  
For instance, in Bakke, the University argued that reserving medical school 
spots for minorities would improve the delivery of medical care to underserved 
minority communities.260  Alternatively, some cite society’s need for more 
minorities in leadership positions as a ground for considering race in 
admissions.261  Other such instrumental justifications include providing role 
models262 and developing an expanded African-American upper middle class 
“able to pass its material advantages and elevated aspirations to subsequent 
generations.”263 
These instrumental justifications for race preferences might seem primarily 
oriented to helping African-Americans and other disadvantaged populations.  
To be sure, that outcome is consistent with these purposes.  Yet many such 
rationales benefit the whole community.  In some roles, African-Americans 
might be more successful than whites.  It is plausible to suggest that African-
 
 259. Excluded from this discussion are disadvantages because of different distributions of 
traits and talents that arguably produce the greatest disparity in rewards.  See, e.g., Nagel, supra 
note 256, at 353-58. 
 260. See Nagel, supra note 256, at 361 (arguing for race preferences to increase black doctors 
on utilitarian grounds).  Cf. Karst & Horowitz, supra note 62, at 970 (arguing for race preferences 
as a way to improve legal representation for minorities). 
 261. See, e.g., BOWEN, supra note 249, at 430.  For a discussion of the role of universities in 
educating office holders, see AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 181-85 (1987). 
 262. Ronald Dworkin called the role model rationale “a calculation of strategy.”  He 
explained: 
[T]hat increasing the number of blacks who are at work in the professions will, in the long 
run, reduce the sense of frustration and injustice and racial self-consciousness in the black 
community to the point at which blacks may begin to think of themselves as individuals 
who can succeed like others through talent and initiative. 
DWORKIN, supra note 107, at 294; Karst & Horowitz, supra note 62, at 970; see also Wygant v. 
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 315 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (endorsing the role 
model theory in public schools).  Others criticize this rationale.  See, e.g., Richard Delgado, 
Affirmative Action as a Majoritarian Device: Or, Do You Really Want to be a Role Model?, 89 
MICH. L. REV. 1222 (1991) (criticizing affirmative action’s reliance on the instrumental rather 
than the compensatory rationale); id. at 1226-31 (criticizing the role model rationale). 
 263. Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative Action 
Debate, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1327, 1329 (1986). 
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American police officers might have better rapport in some minority 
communities than would an all-white complement.  If this interaction translates 
into less crime, the entire community benefits.264  Moreover, rudimentary 
economic principles suggest communal benefits might flow from some race 
preferences.  The relative lack of minorities as doctors, lawyers, or chief 
executive officers suggests an under-utilization of human resources, which, if 
tapped, would better society.  Programs that identify and prepare talented 
African-Americans for these roles might help society increase overall 
productivity by making better use of the pool of human capital.  Finally, 
success of African-Americans and other disadvantaged minorities is critical to 
moving social reality closer to basic American ideals.  America’s democratic 
character becomes less evident if minorities cannot participate in meaningful 
ways in civic life.  The American dream is revealed as part fantasy if it only 
applies to whites. 
The compensatory and instrumental rationales provided part of the 
argument for race preferences in the early days.  Student body diversity was by 
no means the dominant factor.  Writing before Bakke was decided, McGeorge 
Bundy, then-President of the Ford Foundation, suggested that remedying 
societal discrimination was the primary rationale for racial preferences.  He 
wrote: 
Many legitimate purposes have animated those engaged in this effort, but the 
deepest and most general objective—toward which any one school or college 
can do only a little—has been to ensure full and fair access to all parts of our 
social, economic, and professional life for nonwhite Americans.  Of course all 
kinds of Americans deserve such access, and it is right to remember from the 
outset that no past injustice permits us to set any one group above any other.  
But there can be no blinking the enormous and unique set of handicaps which 
our whole history, right up to the present, has imposed on those who are not 
white.  It is not the fault of today’s laws or of the present Supreme Court that 
racism should be our most destructive inheritance.  But that reality makes the 
effort to overcome it a matter of the most compelling interest.265 
He suggested that “what special admissions, and only special admissions, can 
do today is to make access to the learned profession a reality for nonwhites.”266 
 
 264. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 314 (Stevens, J. dissenting); Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 
547, 601-02 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Kennedy, supra note 263, at 1329 (stating 
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 265. McGeorge Bundy, The Issue Before the Court: Who Gets Ahead in America?, THE 
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov. 1977, at 42; see also DEREK BOK, BEYOND THE IVORY TOWER: 
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE MODERN UNIVERSITY, 102-03 (1982). 
 266. Bundy, supra note 265, at 54. 
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Some proponents of racial preference in admissions invoked the 
instrumental argument that society needed more blacks in professional and 
leadership positions.  In 1969, Dean Louis Pollak cited this objective to explain 
Yale Law School’s decision to increase its number of African-American 
students.  He wrote: 
For me, a large part of the answer lies in the fact, which we lawyers have only 
belatedly realized, that far too few black citizens are being trained for positions 
of future leadership.  Leadership-training is needed on many fronts, but it 
seems particularly clear that the country needs far more—and especially far 
more well-trained—black lawyers, bearing in mind that today only 2 or 3 
percent of the American bar is black.267 
Dean Pollak did not cite student body diversity in his defense. 
Similarly, the University of Washington School of Law cited instrumental 
rationales for the admissions policy it adopted in December 1973: “[C]ertain 
ethnic groups in our society have historically been limited in their access to the 
legal profession . . . [that] can affect the quality of legal services available to 
members of such groups, as well as limit their opportunity for full participation 
in the governance of our communities.”268  The policy made no mention of the 
benefits of a diverse student body. 
As suggested by the discussions of Dean Pollak and Mr. Bundy, the 
remedial and instrumental rationales, not diversity, dominated early discussion 
of the merits of race preferences in admissions.  Yet clearly, student diversity 
was embraced as a desirable goal in and of itself pre-Bakke.  In different 
contexts, the Court’s prior jurisprudence hinted at the merit of the rationale.269  
The Harvard College plan celebrated it.270  Similarly, the Supreme Court of 
Washington recognized student body diversity as a compelling state interest in 
DeFunis v. Odegaard.271  It said: 
The legal profession plays a critical role in the policy making sector of our 
society, whether decisions be public or private, state or local.  That lawyers, in 
making and influencing these decisions, should be cognizant of the views, 
needs and demands of all segments of society is a principle beyond dispute.  
 
 267. Louis H. Pollak, Dean Pollak Replies, THE PUBLIC INTEREST, Spring 1970, at 50, 51 
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The educational interest of the state in producing a racially balanced student 
body at the law school is compelling.272 
So, too, did an influential essay that William G. Bowen, then-President of 
Princeton University, wrote in 1977.273  Dr. Bowen pointed out that “a great 
deal of learning occurs informally” through “interactions” among students 
from “different races, religions, and backgrounds.”274  These contacts have 
value.  He wrote: 
Our society—indeed our world—is and will be multiracial.  We simply must 
learn to work more effectively and more sensitively with individuals of other 
races, and a diverse student body can contribute directly to the achievement of 
this end.  One of the special advantages of a residential college is that it 
provides unusually good opportunities to learn about other people and their 
perspectives—better opportunities than many will ever know again.  If people 
of different races are not able to learn together in this kind of setting, and to 
learn about each other as they study common subjects, share experiences, and 
debate the most fundamental questions, we shall have lost an important 
opportunity to contribute to a healthier society—to a society less afflicted by 
the failure of too many people to understand and respect one another. 275 
In the same essay, Dr. Bowen stressed the instrumental rationale “that our 
country needs a far larger number of able people from minority groups in 
leadership positions of all kinds.”276  Dr. Bowen rejected “‘proportional 
representation’ of different races or ethnic groups in various professions.”  But, 
he argued, one could oppose that approach yet “still refuse, as I do, to regard as 
acceptable the present disparities which are clearly products of generations of 
unfair treatment.”277 
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Dr. Bowen’s double-barreled attack was imitated by others.  In an amicus 
brief in Bakke, four leading universities identified two problems from the fact 
that their student bodies were “overwhelmingly white.”  First, by not enrolling 
significant numbers of minority students, they “were continuing to deny 
intellectual house room to a broad spectrum of diverse cultural insights, 
thereby perpetuating a sort of white myopia among students and faculty in 
many academic disciplines.”278  Second, they were doing “next to nothing to 
enlarge the minute minority fraction . . . of the pool of persons with doctoral-
level graduate and professional training” from which universities drew faculty 
“and also the pool from which, increasingly, local and national leaders in the 
public and private sectors tend to be selected.”279  “[M]aking conscious 
efforts” to include minority students helped universities discharge their 
“function of providing tomorrow’s leaders in all walks of life.”280  The brief 
presumed the desirability of “increasing the number of minority doctors, 
judges, corporate executives, university faculty members and government 
officials,” an objective that would not occur unless qualified minority students 
were given educational opportunity.281 
Bakke shifted the terms of the discussion.  Justice Powell embraced the 
student body diversity rationale while either rejecting, or expressing 
reservations about, the other justifications.  Reducing the “historic deficit” of 
minorities in professions was objectionable, at least if tied to “some specified 
percentage.”282  Countering the “effects of ‘societal discrimination’” required 
identified wrongdoing as found by an authoritative governmental body.283  
Justice Powell rejected the instrumental goal of fostering more equitable health 
care delivery because the University had failed to present sufficient evidence 
that its program would promote that goal.284  Although Bakke did not 
categorically reject instrumental rationales, it did not embrace them.  Instead, it 
adopted a narrow conception of diversity grounded in First Amendment values 
and focused on the value diversity added to campus life.  Subsequent cases did 
little to encourage instrumental arguments.  For instance, the Court criticized 
the role model theory in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education as lacking a 
“logical stopping point.”285  Moreover, the idea threatened a return to 
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segregated schools if “[c]arried to its logical extreme.”286  Justice O’Connor 
argued that Justice Powell in Bakke had “decisively rejected” the “desire to 
have more black medical students or doctors” as discriminatory; the desire to 
increase professional classes of African-Americans was unconstitutional.287  
Accordingly, Justice Powell’s student diversity rationale emerged as the only 
possible justification for race preference in admissions programs, although the 
justification was controversial.288  Justice O’Connor seemed to endorse some 
notion of racial diversity as “compelling,” at least in the case of higher 
education.289  But she had rejected diversity in other contexts and had 
suggested that remedying past discrimination was the only compelling interest 
the Court had accepted.290  Diversity was “simply too amorphous, too 
insubstantial, and too unrelated to any legitimate basis for employing racial 
classifications.”291 
Following Bakke, many universities designed their admissions programs to 
fit within the boundaries Justice Powell drew.292  To be sure, Justice Powell’s 
campus-focused diversity rationale had some genuine merit.  Students learn 
more in heterogeneous communities than when exposed solely to those from 
similar backgrounds.293  The diversity rationale also introduced race 
preferences into a strategy to which universities have been committed for 
decades.  Selective universities do not simply admit those students with the 
most robust grade point averages and standardized scores.  They measure 
applicants based upon a range of qualities as well as against the strengths and 
weaknesses of the rest of the class.  They look for the violinist, the journalist, 
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the poet, the shortstop.  They also look for students from different 
backgrounds, places, and walks of life.  When one accepts the virtue of a 
campus that includes students with varied qualities and characteristics, as have 
selective American universities for some time, adding race to the mix 
represents a new variation on an old theme.  To be sure, preferring a student 
based on race raises some concerns not present when simply looking for a 
high-jumper or percussionist.  Whether these issues can be mitigated depends 
in part on the design and implementation of the preference.  The point here is 
simply that the diversity rationale reflects a variation on a long-standing 
commitment of universities. 
Moreover, the diversity rationale introduced a new argument that made 
racial preferences more palatable.  The compensatory rationale imagined a 
zero-sum game with winners and losers fighting over the same scarce 
resources.  Its nomenclature was divisive.  It conceived the relevant universe as 
consisting of wrongdoers (or their progeny) and victims.  The diversity 
rationale transformed the debate by broadening the beneficiaries.  To be sure, 
African-Americans and other minorities benefit.  Exposure to whites on a 
diverse campus is valuable,294 especially to those minorities who seek to 
achieve high levels of influence and accordingly must fare well in 
environments that whites dominate.  Yet the diversity rationale helps whites, 
too.295  The exposure to racial and ethnic minorities enhances their education, 
exposing them to new insights and providing experience in interacting in an 
interracial context that will help them succeed.  Because more whites attend 
selective schools than do blacks, on one measure at least, whites arguably 
benefit more from diversity than do minorities: “While the minority students 
would benefit incidentally from such a program, the primary beneficiaries 
would be the institution and the students whose educational experience would 
be enriched by contact with a broader segment of society.”296  Indeed, evidence 
suggests that students of all races appreciate the contribution diversity makes 
to their education.297  Everyone is a winner (except perhaps for the isolated 
whites who lose spots to preferred minorities). 
Moreover, the diversity rationale mitigated the stigma attached to race-
conscious admissions.  Under its logic, African-Americans and other 
minorities were contributors to, not just beneficiaries of, campus life.  They 
 
 294. Id. at 222. 
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were being admitted because they brought something to the campus that it 
needed.  The experiences associated with being black in America were a 
valued credential, just as having a reliable jump-shot or being from Wyoming 
or an alumni child were all valued credentials.  Recognizing the multitude of 
such factors, as the Harvard College plan did, diminished the stigma attached 
to race. 
Finally, the diversity rationale accorded universities the greatest latitude 
when acting within their expertise.  Universities are most competent to make 
judgments regarding how to define, and deliver, education.  Accordingly, if 
universities believe that campus diversity has pedagogical value, as most have 
argued, that conclusion deserves some respect.  They are less competent, 
however, at determining who society has harmed and who should be sacrificed 
to compensate those deemed disadvantaged. 
Yet diversity, as Justice Powell conceived it, had some clear drawbacks. 
Justice Powell’s diversity rationale deviated from the initial purpose behind 
race preferences.  Affirmative action was initially part of the remedy to give 
African-Americans a fair shake.  It gave a benefit to African-Americans to 
undo the burden that American history had imposed and to allow them to 
participate in the American dream.298  Justice Powell’s diversity rationale had 
an entirely different focus.  It justified racial preference, not as a means to help 
disadvantaged minorities, but as a strategy to allow universities to enhance 
educational quality.299  It might be, as some suggest, that African-Americans 
historically have only been able to advance when their interests coincide with 
those of the larger community or at least some powerful faction of it.300  Yet it 
was somewhat perverse to deny that race-conscious admissions served 
instrumental rationales related to race and to instead treat educational quality 
as the only articulated rationale, as it was in Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke.  
Alternatively, some contended that diversity was merely an argument of 
convenience, not the real rationale.301 
Moreover, diversity might not be the best rationale to advance African-
Americans.  Diversity might broaden the class of preferred candidates.302  The 
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child of Appalachia or of immigrant farm workers, the new immigrant from 
Iran or Russia, and the Alaskan Eskimo might all diversify a campus.  To the 
extent these and other groups claim “diversity” spots, those available for 
African-American candidates will be diminished.  Yet diversity, as Justice 
Powell justified it, would seem to value potential contributions of candidates 
from these groups no less than those of African-Americans. 
B. Grutter’s Justification of Race Preferences 
Notwithstanding these problems associated with the diversity rationale, 
Bakke left it the only available justification of a race-conscious admissions 
program at a university not guilty of past discrimination.  Indeed, parties shied 
away from invoking other justifications.  The societal discrimination rationale 
clearly could not command a majority.  In Grutter, representatives of the Law 
School were quick to deny any remedial intent.  The School’s policy spoke of 
its “commitment to racial and ethnic diversity with special reference to the 
inclusion of students from groups which have been historically discriminated 
against.”303  Justice O’Connor reported that the drafter “explained that this 
language did not purport to remedy past discrimination, but rather to include 
students who may bring to the Law School a perspective different from that of 
members of groups which have not been the victims of such discrimination.”304  
Michigan’s brief focused entirely on arguing that student body diversity was a 
compelling state interest, that Bakke recognized such a rationale, and that 
Michigan’s plan was narrowly tailored to fit it.  Michigan did not attempt to 
persuade the Court of arguments it had previously rejected.  Instead, it 
hammered at the benefits of student diversity. 
At a superficial level, the Court in Grutter simply adopted Justice Powell’s 
student diversity rationale.  Justice O’Connor made a point of noting that 
Michigan Law School, before the Court and throughout the litigation, 
“assert[ed] only one justification for their use of race in the admissions 
process,” that rationale being the diversity justification.305  The Court claimed 
that the narrowly tailored compelling interest that justified a racial 
classification was “‘the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student 
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body.’”306  That rationale suggested that a diverse student body fostered high 
quality education, that students can best learn to address a multicultural society 
and world if they learn and gain experience on campuses consisting of students 
from different racial and ethnic backgrounds.  Thus, in Bakke, Justice Powell 
observed that medical students, who might one day “serve a heterogeneous 
population,” would benefit from exposure in graduate school to students from 
different backgrounds.307  In Grutter, Justice O’Connor found “substantial” 
educational benefits flow from diversity.  These include cross-racial 
understanding that erodes racial stereotypes, richer classroom discussion, and 
better preparation for participating in a diverse workforce.308 
In fact, Grutter went well beyond Justice Powell’s Bakke opinion in the 
rationales it recognized for race preferences.  While repeatedly sounding the 
student diversity chord, Justice O’Connor signaled her novel approach in 
several ways. 
First, although she discussed Bakke extensively, she specifically avoided 
treating it as binding precedent.  Instead, the Court simply endorsed Justice 
Powell’s view that student body diversity was “a compelling state interest that 
can justify the use of race in university admissions.”309  In declining to give 
Bakke stare decisis effect, the Court avoided a main argument Michigan’s Law 
School made.  Indeed, the Law School began its brief by stating the “essential 
holding”310 of Bakke that “a University may consider race in admissions”311 
and claiming that “Settled Principles of Stare Decisis Strongly Counsel 
Against Overruling Bakke.”312  Michigan Law School spent three pages 
applying the criteria for stare decisis from the Casey plurality opinion.  
Although Justice O’Connor and Justice Souter were two of the three co-authors 
of the Casey plurality, they elected not to analyze the problem in that mode. 
Second, Justice O’Connor muted Justice Powell’s reliance on the First 
Amendment.  The First Amendment had allowed Justice Powell to affirm the 
use of race in admissions decisions without basing his opinion on the need to 
address America’s race problems.  Justice Powell explicitly grounded student 
body diversity in the protection the First Amendment gave universities to make 
judgments regarding academic and pedagogic matters.  Justice O’Connor’s 
reliance on the First Amendment was softened and ambiguous.  She attributed 
every reference to the First Amendment or free speech to Justice Powell or 
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earlier Court decisions rather than asserting the connection herself.  And she 
rested her conclusion that Michigan had a compelling state interest in student 
body diversity on a belief that the rationale was “at the heart of the Law 
School’s proper institutional mission” and the school’s good faith should be 
presumed.313  To be sure, she did not reject the First Amendment as a basis for 
her conclusion, but she hardly trumpeted it either. 
Finally, whereas Justice Powell’s discussion focused almost entirely on the 
impact of diversity on the campus, Justice O’Connor saw the payoff as 
occurring primarily after graduation.  Justice Powell made only one comment 
regarding the post-campus benefits of student body diversity, acknowledging, 
almost in passing, that exposure to a diverse student body might “better equip” 
future doctors “to render with understanding their vital service to humanity.”314 
Justice O’Connor devoted pages to the topic.315  She accepted the 
argument of “major American businesses” that America’s economic well-
being was related to diversity: “[T]he skills needed in today’s increasingly 
global marketplace can only be developed through exposure to widely diverse 
people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints.”316  This argument resembled in some 
respects Justice Powell’s passing reference to the benefits of campus diversity 
on post-campus life.  But whereas that single reference represented the furthest 
Justice Powell strayed from campus, this justification represented Justice 
O’Connor’s most modest argument and one to which she devoted barely more 
than a sentence.317 
The Grutter Court implicitly relied on other justifications that went well 
beyond those that Justice Powell identified as well.  Student body diversity was 
not simply a strategy to promote the robust exchange of ideas and learning on 
campus and to expose college and graduate students to a heterogeneous peer 
group.  The Court also saw it as a way to educate more African-Americans and 
other disadvantaged minorities.  The Court thought this rationale important for 
several reasons. 
First, the Court tied race-sensitive admissions to national security.  An 
amicus brief by an impressive list of military leaders argued that race-
conscious admissions programs were necessary to protect national security, the 
most compelling state interest.318  National security depended on a “cohesive 
military” that required “a diverse officer corps and substantial numbers of 
officers educated and trained in diverse educational settings, including the 
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military academics and ROTC programs.”319  The brief sounded two of the 
rationales for race-conscious admissions—the benefits of training in a diverse 
environment and the instrumental need for minority officers.  The latter was 
clearly the dominant theme. The brief focused on the need to attract minority 
officers,320 with the pedagogical benefits of a diverse student body a much 
fainter theme.321  Racial preferences thus were not simply a strategy to provide 
a rich campus experience in which students broadened their horizons; they also 
were a means to develop a potential officer pool including racial minorities.  
Justice O’Connor, in effect, accepted the need to recruit and train more 
minority officers to serve our country.  In Bakke, Justice Powell had rejected as 
a per se violation the University’s desire to increase the number of minority 
medical students and minority physicians.  Military leaders made clear the 
military’s reliance on rather specific minority admissions goals at the various 
military academies.322  For instance, West Point set “specific percentage goals 
for minorities” based upon their representation in the population, college-
bound pool, and army.323  The naval academy used specified goals and targets 
for minorities.324  Justice O’Connor saw no problem.  Whereas the University 
of California-Davis’s instrumental goal of attracting minority doctors to serve 
minority communities was not sufficiently tailored to the end advanced, racial 
preferences were judged necessary to produce the required diverse officer 
corps.325  The reliance on the military argument signaled that First Amendment 
values relating to campus diversity were not all that drove the Court.  If 
campus diversity was all that mattered, as Justice Powell suggested, the 
military arguments would have been totally irrelevant under the circumstances.  
Justice O’Connor’s reliance on them indicated that she viewed diversity in far 
broader terms. 
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The military rationale has been dismissed as a cynical effort to attract and 
motivate African-American soldiers to shoulder disproportionate responsibility 
for fighting America’s wars.326  That interpretation might have a measure of 
truth.  Yet when the military discussion is restored to the context of the 
opinion, it merits a more benevolent spin.  The Court did not discuss military 
leadership alone.  Rather, it located it as one aspect of a larger problem.  The 
Court also justified racial preference at law schools, particularly selective ones, 
because they would help develop a cadre of African-American leaders.  It 
observed that a high percentage of national leaders have law degrees, many 
from selective law schools.  “Access to legal education (and thus the legal 
profession) must be inclusive of talented and qualified individuals of every 
race and ethnicity, so that all members of our heterogeneous society may 
participate in the educational institutions that provide the training and 
education necessary to succeed in America.”327 
Justice O’Connor also justified racial preferences as necessary to promote 
important civic aspirations: “Effective participation by members of all racial 
and ethnic groups in the civic life of our Nation is essential if the dream of one 
Nation, indivisible, is to be realized.”328  Justice O’Connor set up this punch 
line by quoting the government’s amicus brief affirming the “paramount 
government objective” to ensure “that public institutions are open and 
available to all segments of American society, including people of all races and 
ethnicities.”329  This reliance on the government was ironic because it 
supported Grutter’s position and the thrust of its brief expressed little sympathy 
for the Law School’s plan.  Good citizenship depended on education.  
Accordingly, “the diffusion of knowledge and opportunity through public 
institutions of higher education must be accessible to all individuals regardless 
of race or ethnicity.”330  Yet the Court’s stated purpose was not simply to teach 
minorities how to be patriotic citizens.  It was also to make the American 
dream their reality.  “Access to legal education” had to cross racial lines so that 
minorities could “succeed in America,”331 an idea that came from Brown.332  
Thus, the Michigan Law School plan served not only the immediate goal of 
creating a diverse campus, but also the long-term instrumental goal of 
perfecting American society and democracy by promoting participation of 
African-Americans “in the civic life of our Nation.”333 
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The Court also saw race-sensitive admissions as a way to preserve the 
legitimacy of important societal institutions.  Justice O’Connor wrote: 
In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, 
it is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to talented and 
qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity.  All members of our 
heterogeneous society must have confidence in the openness and integrity of 
the educational institutions that provide this training.334 
Although the court did not attribute this idea, it closely resembled a passage in 
the military brief.335 
Finally, the Court saw race-sensitive admissions as a way to combat 
stereotypes that disparage minorities.  The Law School’s desire for a critical 
mass of minority students was not premised on the belief that minorities would 
“‘express some characteristic minority viewpoint on any issue.’”336  On the 
contrary, race-sensitive admissions were designed to enroll a critical mass in 
order to burst such stereotypes.  The “unique experience of being a racial 
minority in a society, like our own, in which race unfortunately still matters” 
would contribute to learning, the Court proclaimed.337 
The rationales Justice O’Connor articulated for race-sensitive admissions 
were certainly not novel.  They had been suggested for years in various 
contexts.  What made her opinion noteworthy was the distance she traveled 
beyond Justice Powell in justifying race preferences.  Rather than adhering to 
Justice Powell’s narrow version of diversity, Justice O’ Connor viewed 
diversity as a broader concept that incorporated some of the very instrumental 
rationales that Justice Powell had rejected. 
C. Influences Behind the Expanded Rationale: Some Speculations 
How did this happen?  One can only speculate.  I cannot prove that any of 
the briefs or prior opinions swayed Justice O’Connor’s thinking, but it is 
interesting to note the overlap between some of them and her opinion. 
Michigan School of Law was constrained by Bakke and did not ask the 
court to accept justifications it had previously rejected.  Yet it exploited 
opportunities to sneak other themes into its student diversity argument.  For 
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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
950 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48:899 
instance, in arguing that Bakke was precedent that should not be overruled, 
Michigan suggested that abandoning Bakke would damage the stability of 
society by making state schools white enclaves.  Michigan stated that: 
[A] decision to overrule Bakke would cut the minority lawyers currently being 
trained by half or three-quarters, resulting in the near-complete absence of 
minority students from the schools that train most of our federal judges, 
prosecutors and law clerks (to say nothing of the new lawyers at our country’s 
leading law firms).338 
Michigan’s argument did not persuade the Court of its asserted purpose—to 
apply Bakke as binding precedent.  Still, the Court made similar arguments that 
race-sensitive admissions were necessary to furnish society’s need for African-
American leaders and lawyers.339 
Michigan’s stability of society argument helped shape Justice O’Connor’s 
opinion in a second respect independent of its asserted intent.  Justice 
O’Connor argued that only racially diverse institutions would be seen as 
legitimate by the entire citizenry.  Michigan made this argument in insisting 
that Bakke not be overruled: 
As our country becomes increasingly racially diverse, the public confidence in 
law enforcement and legal institutions so essential to the coherence and 
stability of our society will be difficult to maintain if the segments of the bench 
and bar currently filled by graduates of those institutions again become a 
preserve for white graduates, trained in isolation from the communities they 
will serve.340 
Michigan’s argument was close to the formulation Justice O’Connor adopted, 
but not as close as a passage from the military brief: “Broad access to the 
education that leads to leadership roles is essential to public confidence in the 
fairness and integrity of public institutions, and their ability to perform their 
vital functions and missions.”341 
Finally, Michigan’s arguments concerning stereotyping apparently 
connected with Justice O’Connor.  She had previously related race preferences 
to impermissible stereotypes.342  Michigan devoted pages of its brief to 
addressing Justice O’Connor’s specific articulated concerns.  It wrote in part: 
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The Law School does not premise its need for a racially integrated student 
body on any belief that minority students always (or even consistently) express 
some characteristic minority viewpoint on any issue.  To the contrary, breaking 
down such stereotypes is a crucial part of its mission, and one that cannot be 
advanced with only token numbers of minority students.  The Law School 
values the presence of minority students because they will have direct, 
personal experiences that white students cannot—experiences which are 
relevant to the Law School’s mission.343 
The Court quoted part of this language.344  Moreover, Michigan’s distinction 
between “the fiction that race determines a person’s ‘belief and behavior’” and 
“the inescapable reality that race affects life experiences in our society”345 
apparently resonated with Justice O’Connor who acknowledged that the 
“unique experience of being a racial minority” would likely affect views.346 
Justice O’Connor did cite Justice Powell’s Bakke opinion at length in 
Grutter.  Yet it was by no means the only text that influenced her opinion.  As 
shown above, arguments from a small set of briefs also found their way into 
the Court’s opinion and expanded the dimensions of the student diversity 
rationale. 
Ultimately, Justice O’Connor’s opinion also reflected a more surprising 
influence—the opinion of Justice Marshall in Bakke.  To be sure, Grutter did 
not come out as he would have written it.  Most significantly, the societal 
discrimination rationale that he advanced received no sympathetic hearing 
from Justice O’Connor.  Yet other strands of his argument did find their way 
into her opinion. 
The vision of an open and inclusive society was central to her thinking; she 
devoted several paragraphs of her Grutter opinion to this theme: “Effective 
participation by members of all racial and ethnic groups in the civic life of our 
Nation is essential if the dream of one Nation, indivisible, is to be realized.”347  
This idea echoed from Justice Marshall’s opinion.  He complained that 
America excluded Negroes.  Thus “meaningful equality remains a distant 
dream for the Negro.”348  According to Justice Marshall, “[t]he dream of 
America as the great melting pot has not been realized for the Negro; because 
of his skin color he never even made it into the pot.”349  Therefore, “bringing 
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the Negro into the mainstream of American life should be a state interest of the 
highest order.  To fail to do so is to ensure that America will forever remain a 
divided society.”350  The “doors” to positions had been closed to Negroes; “[i]f 
we are ever to become a fully integrated society” steps must be taken “to open 
those doors.”351  Justice O’Connor used similar rhetoric and metaphors.352 
Justice O’Connor’s opinion borrowed a few themes from an older work in 
which Thurgood Marshall also played a part, Brown v. Board of Education.  Its 
two principal ideas echoed in her opinion.  She, too, saw education as “‘the 
very foundation of good citizenship’”353 and as the ticket to participate in the 
American dream.  And, if she did not display Chief Justice Warren’s 
communitarian idea as fully as she might have, her opinion embraced the 
vision of a racially inclusive society that was Brown’s own contribution. 
D. The Significance of Grutter’s Broadened Rationale 
Justice O’Connor’s Grutter opinion provided a more complete and 
convincing defense of race preferences in university admissions than had 
Bakke a quarter century earlier.  She did not abandon the notion of campus 
diversity.  Yet, her approach mitigated some of the problems with the diversity 
rationale by expanding it beyond the narrow parameters Justice Powell drew.  
She recognized that a diverse student body was not simply a means to foster a 
robust campus experience or even to prepare people to work well in a 
multicultural and multiracial workforce.  For Justice O’Connor, race was not a 
relevant factor of diversity simply because it shaped experiences and 
accordingly contributed to campus life; it also was included because of a need 
to increase participation of African-Americans in civic life.  It was an 
instrumental means to build a better society—increasing the number of 
African-Americans in leadership positions, enhancing the legitimacy of social 
institutions, combating stereotypes, improving civic participation, and 
ultimately making the American dream a reality.  Finally, race preferences, for 
Justice O’Connor, were not primarily to benefit whites by enriching their 
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education.  They served that purpose, but also were a way to allow African-
Americans a more complete opportunity to participate in American life. 
In addition to providing a more persuasive defense of race preferences in 
admissions, Justice O’Connor’s opinion contributed in a second critical way.  
Her opinion, and the sources it cited, demonstrated that race-sensitive 
admissions plans represent a consensus approach of a broad spectrum of 
American society. Those who endorsed approaches, like that at issue in 
Grutter, were not simply a predictable collection of civil rights groups with a 
perceived stake in the outcome.  They included, too, bastions of the American 
establishment—major universities, Fortune 500 corporations, and the armed 
services.  That such institutions also identified their interests as inextricably 
linked to race-sensitive admissions underscored the importance of these 
programs. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
To be sure, Grutter’s long-term impact is uncertain.  For the immediate 
future, it threw a strong life-line to university admissions programs using racial 
preferences to produce a diverse student body.  In articulating the rationale, the 
Court channeled the universities’ use of race-sensitive criteria in areas that 
coincided with their basic mission.  The opinion’s undercurrents suggest a 
broader rationale—to open channels whereby more minorities can participate 
in leadership positions in society, to help America make the American dream a 
reality for all.  These rationales—diversity and instrumental—are forward-
looking and designed to improve social utility.  They license universities 
particularly within their areas of special expertise.  They allow universities to 
serve societal needs without impairing their basic mission. 
It is not at all clear what, if any, impact the decision will have beyond 
college and graduate admissions.  The instrumental rationales are tied to 
diversity.  Thus, Grutter might be limited to applications where a diverse 
population provides either the specific benefits Justice O’Connor identifies or 
at least some gain related to education.  And Grutter’s future might turn, in 
part, on the fortuity of judicial retirements and appointments.  Who will retire 
first and when?  Will affirmative action become a litmus test for Supreme 
Court nominees? 
Moreover, without ignoring the positive impact of programs of race-
sensitive admissions at colleges and universities, we should not overstate their 
impact.  To be sure, they have conferred clear benefits, but they are by no 
means a full solution to racial disparities that afflict our country.  After all, 
they afford benefits to a relatively select portion of the minority population.  
They offer no relief to those who do not apply to college or graduate school.  It 
is difficult to see such efforts ameliorating racial disparities absent 
commitment to redressing the gaps that exist in K–12 education.  In many 
urban areas, African-American children attend inferior schools in 
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circumstances that make learning difficult.  Race-sensitive admissions are 
simply one approach to affording opportunity.  Clearly, additional strategies 
must exist to address other racial disparities. 
Nevertheless, Grutter represents a judicial reaffirmation of the 
constitutional ideal of a racially open society.  We might lament that fifty years 
after Brown that vision remains a challenge for the future rather than an 
accomplishment of the past.  On the other hand, Grutter’s renewed 
commitment to that vision of a racially diverse society provides something to 
celebrate on this fiftieth anniversary of Brown. 
 
